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865 
THE CASE FOR A LIMITED 
PROTECTION OF TRADEMARK 
MERCHANDISING 
Irene Calboli* 
Since its judicial creation in the 1970s, strong controversy has 
surrounded the practice of trademark merchandising.  Trademark 
scholars have generally opposed merchandising rights because of the 
departure from the traditional interpretation of trademark law—
protecting consumers and market competition—in favor of a direct 
protection of trademark value.  Despite this opposition, courts and 
Congress have favored the acceptance of this practice by broadening 
the scope of trademark protection and by introducing the concept of 
confusion as to the products’ “sponsorship” or “affiliation” as part of 
the standard for trademark infringement.  Not surprisingly, trade-
mark scholars have criticized these developments but have not of-
fered, so far, a solution that is responsive to the changes that have af-
fected the role of marks in the past decades.  This Article fills this gap 
and, contrary to the position of the majority of scholars, advocates in 
favor of providing legal protection to trademark merchandising un-
der the current rule of trademark law.  Specifically, this Article ac-
cepts that in the modern economy the concept of commercial source 
can also include products’ sponsorship and affiliation as indicated by 
the courts and accepted by the legislature.  Based upon this premise, 
this Article recognizes that the use of trademarks on promotional 
products that are offered for sale can legitimately serve the traditional 
distinctive function of trademarks and indicate to the public the origin 
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of the marked products, at least in terms of trademark owners’ spon-
sorship or affiliation.  Contrary to common criticism, this recognition 
of merchandising marks as legitimate source indicators would not ne-
gatively affect competition in the market or consumers.  Instead, it 
would finally provide a clear guideline in this important area of the 
law and subject trademark merchandising to the general rules for the 
acquisition and enforcement of trademark rights as well as to existing 
trademark defenses and fair uses. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The trademark debate has long been dominated by strong disa-
greements over the scope of trademark protection.1  Trademark theorists 
have argued that trademark law should exclusively protect consumers 
and market competition, whereas practitioners and trademark owners 
have supported the position that the law should primarily protect the 
value of trademarks.2  In recent decades, as the role of trademarks has 
reached unprecedented importance in society, these disagreements have 
grown stronger and created a dangerous divide between trademark 
theory and practice.3  In turn, this divide has created increasing uncer-
tainty in fundamental aspects of trademark law and policy to the detri-
ment of fair competition in the marketplace.  In previous works, I have 
considered this uncertainty with respect to trademark assignment4 and 
trademark licensing,5 and I have proposed solutions that could bridge the 
divide between trademark theory and practice in these areas while still 
protecting consumers and market competition.  In this Article, I advance 
my efforts to bridge this dangerous divide by addressing one of the most 
controversial aspects of the trademark debate—trademark merchandis-
ing.6  
A booming trademark practice and a ubiquitous phenomenon in 
today’s society, trademark merchandising made its first appearance a few 
decades ago in the sports world7 and has since emerged as one of the 
most fruitful marketing and sales techniques in the modern economy.8  
                                                                                                                                      
 1. For the historical development of trademark law, see FRANK I. SCHECHTER, THE 
HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING TO TRADE-MARKS (1925). 
 2. See discussion infra Part III.A.  A “trademark” is defined as “any word, name, symbol, or 
device . . . used . . . to identify and distinguish . . . goods . . . from those manufactured or sold by oth-
ers” by the Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946 § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).  The Lanham Act defines 
a “service mark” similarly.  See id.  This Article will use the terms “trademark” and “mark” inter-
changeably to refer to any word or symbol protected under the Lanham Act. 
 3. See, e.g., Thomas D. Drescher, The Transformation and Evolution of Trademarks—From 
Signals to Symbols to Myth, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 301 (1992). 
 4. Irene Calboli, Trademark Assignment “With Goodwill”: A Concept Whose Time Has Gone, 
57 FLA. L. REV. 771, 832 (2005) (proposing a rule of assignment “with or without goodwill” that would 
reflect current judicial decisions and still focus primarily on protecting consumers and market competi-
tion). 
 5. Irene Calboli, The Sunset of “Quality Control” in Modern Trademark Licensing, 57 AM. U. 
L. REV. 341, 396 (2007) (suggesting a change toward licensing “with or without control” in line with 
current case law and based on the assessment of consistent product quality rather than business con-
trol, to the advantage of both trademark owners and consumers).  
 6. Although trademark merchandising represents a growing business technique in most market 
sectors, to date no dictionary or other source provides a definition of “trademark merchandising” or 
“merchandising rights” in the business or legal context.  For a criticism of the lack of such definition, 
and its consequences, see discussion infra Part II, where I provide a tentative definition of this prac-
tice.  This Article will use the terms “trademark merchandising,” “merchandising,” and “merchandis-
ing rights” interchangeably. 
 7. See discussion infra Part III.B.1.  
 8. For a list of the top global brands, see 100 Best Global Brands, BUS. WK., Sept. 28, 2009, at 
50 (reporting that in 2009 the “top five” brands were: COCA-COLA, IBM, MICROSOFT, GE, and 
NOKIA); see also Christina Binkley, Like Our Sunglasses? Try Our Vodka!, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 
2007, at D1 (“We have entered into an age of luxury-brand extensions gone wild.  Luggage companies 
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Technically, with the expressions “trademark merchandising” or “mer-
chandising rights,” business operators refer to the use of trademarks on 
products unrelated to trademark owners’ primary activity—HARLEY-
DAVIDSON jackets or HARLEY-DAVIDSON key chains, in addition 
to HARLEY-DAVIDSON motorcycles, for example—directly or more 
commonly under licensing agreements with professional manufacturers 
of these promotional products.9  As this Article elaborates, companies 
and other entities generally engage in merchandising activities to estab-
lish or increase consumer affiliation and build brand image.10  For the 
owners of famous marks, merchandising products also represent an in-
creasingly relevant source of additional sales and profits.11  A visit to any 
local mall or department store invariably demonstrates the market rel-
evance of merchandising goods.  With many possible variations, we could 
encounter: mugs with the logos of our favorite baseball or basketball 
teams; jackets or t-shirts with a large choice of college or sports emblems; 
collector items with a variety of symbols, from the OLYMPIC GAMES 
to RACE FOR THE CURE; and also calendars, pencils, and key chains 
with the logos of these stores. 
Interestingly, despite the pervasiveness of merchandised products in 
our society, the scope of the protection of trademark merchandising is 
not explicitly defined under the rule of trademark law but instead consti-
tutes one of the most controversial issues in the trademark debate.12  His-
torically, the validity of trademark merchandising was first addressed by 
a series of judicial decisions in the 1970s that expanded the interpretation 
of the traditional requirement for trademark infringement—“likelihood 
of consumer confusion”—to include confusion as to the products’ “spon-
sorship” or “affiliation” to directly protect trademarks used on promo-
tional goods.13  Generally, the majority of scholars criticized this judicial 
                                                                                                                                      
make clothes, clothing makers make chocolate, and practically everyone makes watches and per-
fume.”). 
 9. See RICHARD RAYSMAN ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSING: FORMS AND 
ANALYSIS § 4.08[2] (2010) (explaining the advantages of licensing, including increased market pres-
ence and brand awareness).  On the use of licensing in the merchandising context, see W.J. Keating, 
Promotional Trademark Licensing: A Concept Whose Time Has Come, 89 DICK. L. REV. 363, 363 
(1985) (noting that promotional licensing has developed into a “substantial line of commerce”).  For 
detailed definitions of this practice, see infra note 35.  This Article will use the terms “trademark li-
censing,” “licensing,” and “licensing agreement” interchangeably. 
 10. See Charles W. Grimes & Gregory J. Battersby, The Protection of Merchandising Properties, 
69 TRADEMARK REP. 431, 432 (1979).  Businesses and other entities also engage in complimentary 
promotional products as a means for advertising their activities.  See Best Things at Show Are Free?, 
USA TODAY, Apr. 5, 1994, at 11E. 
 11. HARLEY-DAVIDSON has found it financially advantageous, for example, to engage in 
extensive merchandising activities.  Jerry Shriver, Richer, Older ‘Like Everyone Else,’ USA TODAY, 
Mar. 8, 2002, at 1A. 
 12. See, e.g., 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION §§ 24:10–12 (4th ed. 2010) (offering a comprehensive analysis of the positions on 
trademark merchandising). 
 13. But see Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or 
Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 473–75 (2005) (arguing that the courts’ reasoning in these cases 
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shift, arguing that recognizing merchandising rights would result in pro-
tecting trademarks beyond their function as indicators of commercial 
“source” to the detriment of competition.14  Regardless of these criti-
cisms, courts continued to favor this practice, as merchandising grew in 
popularity due to changes in the economy, the rise of consumerism, and 
the globalization of trade.15  Eventually, this judicial favor for merchan-
dising and for trademarks in general also reached the legislature, and in 
1988 the doctrine of “confusion as to the sponsorship” was introduced 
into the Federal Trademark Act (Lanham Act).16  The adoption of the 
Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) in 1995 continued this trend 
and enhanced the protection of trademark value for famous marks re-
gardless of any consumer confusion by basing it on a likelihood of dilu-
tion of trademark distinctiveness.17   
Hence, although undoubtedly a “fait accompli”18 in trademark prac-
tice, neither the judiciary nor Congress ever adequately framed the pro-
tection of merchandising rights in the legal context.  Predictably, this has 
left room for doctrinal opposition.  This opposition has in turn created 
uncertainty in this area also because, while criticizing the courts’ ap-
proach to trademark merchandising, opponents have so far not offered 
an alternative solution that is responsive to the changes that have af-
fected the role of trademarks in the modern economy.19  This Article ar-
gues against this uncertainty and, contrary to the position expressed by 
the majority of scholars, advocates for explicitly protecting trademark 
merchandising under current trademark rules.  Specifically, this Article 
accepts that, in the modern economy, the notion of commercial source 
could also include products’ sponsorship or affiliation—a concept that 
can no longer be ignored although it needs to be interpreted cautiously.20  
                                                                                                                                      
was circular and fallible).  For the statutory requirement for trademark infringement, see Lanham Act 
§§ 32, 43, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (2006). 
 14. See Veronica J. Cherniak, Ornamental Use of Trademarks: The Judicial Development and 
Economic Implications of an Exclusive Merchandising Right, 69 TUL. L. REV. 1311, 1355 (1995) 
(“Granting trademark owners exclusive rights to the commercial value of their marks would create 
inefficient, restricted access markets.”); Dogan & Lemley, supra note 13, at 472 (“Rather than indicat-
ing something to the consumer about the source . . . of a product, the mark is the product . . . .”). 
 15. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 16. Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, sec. 132, § 43(a), 102 Stat. 3935, 
3946 (1988) (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141n); see discussion infra Part III.B.2.  
 17. Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, secs. 3(a), 4, §§ 43, 45, 
109 Stat. 985, 985–86 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125, 1127) (effective Jan. 16, 1996).  The 
FTDA has been amended by the Trademark Dilution Revision Act (TDRA) of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-
312, secs. 2, 3(e), §§ 43, 45, 120 Stat. 1730, 1733 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125, 1127) (ef-
fective Oct. 6, 2006).  See discussion infra Part III.B.2. 
 18. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 13, at 506. 
 19. See discussion infra Part II. 
 20. This Article acknowledges that profound changes in product manufacturing have affected 
the concept of commercial “source” and that “source” legitimately extends to trademark owners’ 
“sponsorship” of, or “affiliation” with, the marked products as affirmed by the courts and accepted by 
Congress.  This Article does not accept, however, an extensive interpretation of “sponsorship” and 
“affiliation” beyond situations where marks are actually used to identify products that are offered for 
sale in the market.  See also Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33 (2003).  
“[R]eading the phrase ‘origin of goods’ in the Lanham Act in accordance with the Act’s common-law 
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Accordingly, this Article recognizes that marks used to identify promo-
tional products could legitimately fulfill the traditional distinctive func-
tion of trademarks and indicate to the public the source of these prod-
ucts, at least in terms of products’ sponsorship or affiliation.  Contrary to 
common criticism, this explicit protection of merchandising would not 
unnaturally expand the scope of trademark law.  The acquisition and en-
forcement of trademark rights on promotional products would continue 
to be subjected to the existing trademark rules and defenses.21  This ex-
plicit recognition of merchandising, however, would benefit the legal sys-
tem by offering a needed guideline in this important area of the law and 
the economy, notably by clarifying that trademarks used on merchandis-
ing products should follow general trademark principles.22   
The Article proceeds as follows: Part II addresses the absence, to 
date, of a satisfactory legal framework for trademark merchandising and 
clarifies that marks used on promotional products, directly by trademark 
owners or under licensing, could legitimately identify products’ commer-
cial source, at least in terms of business control.  Part III reconstructs the 
history of merchandising, recounts its judicial creation, and considers 
whether merchandising protection could be framed under existing statu-
tory provisions, in particular antidilution law.  Part IV explores the tradi-
tional academic criticism against merchandising rights, the established 
acceptance of this practice in the business world, and stresses the unwel-
come consequences of the lack of a clear position on the issue.  Part V 
highlights the flaws of the arguments currently characterizing the mer-
chandising debate and concludes the Article by supporting the case for 
protecting trademark merchandising under the current norms and doc-
trines applied to all marks.  
                                                                                                                                      
foundations . . . we conclude that the phrase refers to the producer of the tangible goods that are offered 
for sale, and not to the author of any idea, concept, or communication embodied in those goods.”  Id. 
at 37 (emphasis added).  On the concept of “source” in modern trademark law, and the problem there-
with, see Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413 (2010) (cri-
ticizing the expansion of products’ source so as to encompass a large variety of untraditional situations 
not related to the sale of goods) and Mark P. McKenna, Trademark Use and the Problem of Source, 
2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 773, 821. 
 21. On the problems related to the application of defenses and fair use in trademark law, see 
generally William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. Rev. 49, 54 (2008) (offer-
ing a comprehensive review of the issues affecting the practical implementation of fair use in trade-
mark law, with particular attention to chilling effects in the market due to competitors’ risk aversion 
and high costs of litigation). 
 22. This Article focuses on the analysis of trademark merchandising with respect to the use of 
trademarks on promotional goods that are offered for sale and does not elaborate on the problems 
surrounding the interpretation of products’ “sponsorship” and “affiliation” beyond these uses.  This 
Article also does not specifically address questions purely related to the expressive use of trademarks 
or freedom of speech and antitrust issues that can derive from the indiscriminate use of trademark 
merchandising and the non-appropriate use of trademark defenses.  For a general discussion on these 
aspects, see Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, 109 MICH. L. REV. 137 (2010); 
Lisa P. Ramsey, Increasing First Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark Law, 61 SMU L. REV. 381 (2008).  
On antitrust issues, see Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2208–11 (2010); Out 
of Many, One, ECONOMIST, Jan. 23, 2010, at 32. 
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II. DEFINING TRADEMARK MERCHANDISING 
Undoubtedly a widespread technique in the business world, trade-
mark merchandising still lacks a precise framework in the legal context.  
Specifically, while the terms “trademark merchandising,” “promotional 
merchandising,” and “merchandised products” have been used by courts, 
academics, and legal practitioners for many years, no dictionary, court 
decision, or academic article has provided, so far, a precise definition of 
these terms or has clearly identified the requirements and the legal 
boundaries of merchandising rights.23  Not surprisingly, because of the 
absence of a precise framework for these important aspects, confusion 
and inconsistent debates have traditionally dominated this area of the 
law.24 
Although not comprehensive, general definitions of merchandising 
can nonetheless be found in major dictionaries, which describe this prac-
tice primarily as “promotion of sales (of goods) by advertising and pub-
licity” or as “sales promotion” that could include “market research, de-
velopment of new products, coordination of manufacture and marketing, 
and effective advertising and selling.”25  Unfortunately, these definitions 
do not elaborate on the nature or the conditions for the validity of this 
activity of “sale promotion” or address details such as who can legiti-
mately practice it and under what conditions.  On the other side, spe-
cialized legal dictionaries do not offer any definition of the terms 
“trademark merchandising,” “merchandising rights,” or “promotional 
merchandising,” thus corroborating the conclusion that, although widely 
accepted in the business world, the recognition of this practice in the le-
gal context remains uncertain.26 
Besides this lack of guidance from legal dictionaries, court decisions 
and academic writings have also traditionally fallen short of exhaustively 
defining trademark merchandising or merchandising rights.  In particu-
lar, courts and scholars have predominately focused their analyses on de-
scribing, positively or negatively, the rationale and effect of merchandis-
ing as a business technique rather than providing a general legal 
framework for this practice.27  Specifically, courts have defined merchan-
                                                                                                                                      
 23. Current literature reflects the lack of a precise definition of these terms.  For specific defini-
tions by dictionaries, courts, and scholars, see infra notes 25–26 and accompanying text. 
 24. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 25. WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 742 (1983).  The Oxford English Dic- 
tionary, however, does not define “merchandising” and only provides a definition of “trade-marking” 
under the word “trade-mark” as “to affix or imprint a trade-mark upon.”  18 OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY 351 (2d ed. 1989). 
 26. Black’s Law Dictionary provides a definition of “merchandise” as “a movable object in-
volved in trade or traffic; that which is passed from hand to hand by purchase and sale.”  BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1008 (8th ed. 2004). 
 27. See Cherniak, supra note 14, at 1345–54 (criticizing the possible market distortion resulting 
from merchandising).  But see Robert C. Denicola, Institutional Publicity Rights: An Analysis of the 
Merchandising of Famous Trade Symbols, 62 N.C. L. REV. 603, 627–31 (1984) (arguing that the impact 
of merchandising rights on market competition would be negligible). 
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dising as an “attempt to capitalize on public receptiveness to a concept, 
idea or word which [a company] has been responsible for creating or  
popularizing,”28 or as the use of trademarks “to identify and distinguish a 
‘secondary source’ in the sense of indicating sponsorship or authorization 
by a recognized entity.”29  Similarly, scholars have described merchandis-
ing rights as, for example, “affix[ing] a trademark to products primarily 
to attract customers who wish to express allegiance, association, or sym-
pathy with the trademark owner”30 or, more negatively, as “‘trafficking’ 
in trademarks in order to exploit the pure fame and publicity value of a 
mark.”31 
Given the importance of merchandising in today’s economy, how-
ever, this definitional uncertainty should be addressed.  Undoubtedly, as 
indicated by the various descriptions above, the activity undertaken as 
trademark merchandising consists of exploiting trademark goodwill, or 
attractive power, by using trademarks on promotional products, such as 
sweatshirts, jackets, key chains, or pencils, to create consumer affiliation 
and increase brand image.32  Generally, this activity can also be grouped 
in two different types of merchandising depending on the marks at issue.  
On one side, “brand exploiter” merchandising is where famous or luxury 
marks, such as RED SOX, HARLEY-DAVIDSON, or college logos, are 
used on unrelated products to enhance customer affiliation and to gener-
ate profits through the sale of the merchandised goods.33  On the other 
side, “advertising” merchandising is where ordinary marks or marks op-
erating in less brand sensitive sectors, such as STATE FARM, 
                                                                                                                                      
 28. Am. Footwear Corp. v. Gen. Footwear Co., 609 F.2d 655, 660 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 29. Univ. Book Store v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1405 
(T.T.A.B. 1994).  Similarly, courts have described merchandised products as “properties [that] . . . 
create consumer demand for products with which they are associated.”  Universal City Studios, Inc. v. 
Montgomery Ward & Co., 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 852, 858 (N.D. Ill. 1980).  “Trade-mark merchandising 
means merchandise that is extensively advertised, and being extensively advertised, must live up to 
high quality.”  Ely Lilly & Co. v. Saunders, 4 S.E.2d 528, 533 (N.C. 1939), overruled by Bulova Watch 
Co. v. Brand Distribs. of N. Wilkesboro, Inc., 206 S.E.2d 141, 151 (N.C. 1974).   
 30. Lisa H. Johnston, Drifting Toward Trademark Rights in Gross, 85 TRADEMARK REP. 19, 29 
(1995). 
 31. Neil J. Wilkof, Same Old Tricks or Something New? A View of Trade Mark Licensing and 
Quality Control, 5 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 261 (1996), reviewed in 87 TRADEMARK REP. 334, 335 
(1997); see also Grimes & Battersby, supra note 10, at 431 (“‘Merchandising properties’ include any 
word . . . when used on or in association with a particular product, will create consumer demand there-
for.”); Keating, supra note 9, at 363 (defining “Promotional Trademark Licensing” as “commercial 
activity” whereby “the consumer is more interested in identification with the trademark owner than in 
the quality of the goods bearing the trademark”). 
 32. See Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 961 (1993) (noting the 
“growing tendency to use trademarks not just to identify products but also to enhance or adorn them, 
even to create new commodities altogether”). 
 33. See Denicola, supra note 27, at 604 (arguing that consumers often seem willing to pay a high-
er price for products carrying their favorite logos).  The importance of trademarks as brands and 
sources of revenue for companies is clearly explained by the growing relevance in the business world 
of publication such as 100 Best Global Brands, supra note 8, at 50.  On the same aspect, see also Li-
censing Programmes, INTANGIBLE BUSINESS, http://www.intangiblebusiness.com/Brand-Services/ 
Marketing-Services/Licensing~78.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2011) (“Brand licensing generates new 
revenue streams and other commercial benefits for brands, with little direct cost.”). 
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COLDWELL BANKER, or grocery store logos, are used on promotion-
al products as an additional form of advertising about the main activity of 
the entities they represent and where products are distributed to mem-
bers of those entities or to the public complimentary.34 
Although partially different in scope, brand exploiter and advertis-
ing merchandising nonetheless share the same legal structure and are 
usually based on licensing agreements.35  Specifically, rather than produc-
ing the promotional products directly, trademark owners commonly out-
source this production and authorize professional manufacturers to affix 
their marks on promotional products, either in exchange for a royalty for 
brand exploiter merchandising or at cost for advertising merchandising.36  
Not surprisingly, the licensing growth in past decades has played a fun-
damental role in the rise of merchandising activities and trademark own-
ers have increasingly filed trademark applications with the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office (USPTO)37 for products to be manufactured ex-
clusively under licensing.38  Still, as long as trademark owners formally 
control the quality of the products, the use of the marks by licensees con-
                                                                                                                                      
 34. See Best Things at Show Are Free?, supra note 10, at 11E (noting that in the early 1990s, 
company “freebies” were a “$5.2 billion-a-year industry”).  Examples of products in this industry in-
clude coasters, coffee mugs, t-shirts, hats, pens, desk accessories, notepads, and refrigerator magnets.  
Id. 
 35. The term “license” is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as a “formal, usually a 
printed or written permission from a constituted authority to . . . carry on some trade. . . .”  8 OXFORD 
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 890 (2d ed. 1989).  Black’s Law Dictionary defines “license” as a “permission, 
usu. revocable, to commit some act that would otherwise be unlawful. . . .”  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 938 (8th ed. 2004); see also 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 18:1 (“[A] license of a mark 
‘is a limited permit to another to use the mark.’”); JOHN W. SCHLICHER, LICENSING INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY: LEGAL, BUSINESS, AND MARKET DYNAMICS 30–38 (1996) (highlighting the legal and eco-
nomic factors in favor of trademark licensing). 
 36. See, e.g., GREGORY J. BATTERSBY & CHARLES W. GRIMES, LICENSING DESK BOOK 3, 4 
(1999); see also GREGORY J. BATTERSBY & CHARLES W. GRIMES, LICENSING DESK BOOK, 2003 
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT 3, 5 (2003) (providing an overview of merchandising and brand licensing). 
 37. Trademark applications are filed with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) iden-
tifying specific products under the classification established by the Nice Agreement Concerning the 
International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks, June 
15, 1957, 23 U.S.T. 1336, http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/treaties/en/classification/nice/pdf/trt 
docs_wo019.pdf.  As this Article elaborates, trademark applications can be filed based on actual use or 
bona fide intent to use marks in commerce.  See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 19:10 (noting that 
proof of use is required for the issuing of trademark registrations); infra Part IV.2.  
 38. See, e.g., In re Olin Corp., 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 182, 183 (T.T.A.B. 1973) (stating that a com-
pany emblem on a t-shirt may be registered as a trademark for t-shirts); see also Olga Kharif, Will GE 
Bring Good Things to Cameras?, BUS. WK., Mar. 5, 2007, at 10 (discussing a licensing agreement 
where “eight digital cameras and a photo printer will be designed and marketed by a startup to be sold 
worldwide under the GE brand.”). 
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stitutes legitimate trademark use39 as if trademark owners were using the 
marks directly.40   
Based upon this premise, this Article suggests that, in the legal con-
text, the terms “trademark merchandising” and “merchandising rights” 
explicitly refer to the use of trademarks on unrelated and promotional 
products directly by trademark owners, or most often under licensing 
agreements, to identify and distinguish these products in the market, for 
example a RED SOX hat from a YANKEES hat.  As this Article elabo-
rates, to explicitly recognize merchandising rights in these terms would 
not alter the scope of trademark protection but would instead cabin mer-
chandising under current trademark rules.  More importantly, it would 
provide protection only as long as marks continue to function as indica-
tors of commercial source for products offered for sale even if only in 
terms of business approval, sponsorship, or affiliation, but not necessarily 
actual product manufacturing.41 
III. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENTS OF TRADEMARK MERCHANDISING 
Although still ill defined by dictionaries, courts, and academics, 
trademark merchandising constitutes one of the most prominent com-
mercial strategies of today’s society.  Whether trademarks are used on 
promotional products to build consumer affiliation or to exploit such af-
filiation and increase producers’ shares in unrelated market sectors, mer-
chandised goods surround us everywhere.  Still, since it first appeared in 
the marketplace, trademark merchandising has been somewhat at odds 
with traditional trademark theory due to the inherent value that this 
practice confers to trademarks per se. 
Part III reconstructs the history of trademark merchandising with 
particular attention to its creation by courts, the continuing judicial de-
velopments, and the tension that this practice has brought to the tradi-
tional interpretation of trademark law and policies.  Part III also ad-
dresses the possibility of framing merchandising protection within the 
existing norms of the trademark statute, specifically under the current 
provisions against trademark infringement and trademark dilution. 
                                                                                                                                      
 39. The general premise for trademark protection is that marks are either in use or are intended 
to be in use.  See Lanham Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2006).  In recent years, much debate has charac-
terized this requirement.  See, e.g., Margreth Barrett, Internet Trademark Suits and the Demise of 
“Trademark Use,” 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 371, 378 (2006); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, 
Grounding Trademark Law Through Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L. Rev. 1669, 1675 (2007); cf. Graeme 
B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion over Use: Contextualism in Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. 
REV. 1597, 1610 (2007). 
 40. See Lanham Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 1055 (“Where a . . . mark . . . is or may be used legitimately 
by related companies, such use shall inure to the benefit of the registrant . . . and . . . shall not affect 
the validity of such mark . . . provided such mark is not used in such manner as to deceive the pub-
lic.”).  For the analysis of this requirement, see Calboli, supra note 5, at 380. 
 41. See discussion infra Part.V.B. 
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A. Trademark Merchandising and Traditional Trademark Protection 
As this Article highlights, strong disagreements have traditionally 
characterized the debate over the acceptance of trademark merchandis-
ing since this practice emerged in the business world.  Not surprisingly, 
the main reason for such disagreements rests on the often opposing views 
of the general scope of trademark protection among trademark owners 
and practitioners, who are usually in favor of broader trademark rights 
and support trademark merchandising,42 and academics, who generally 
advocate for minimal trademark protection and oppose merchandising 
because of its departure from the original purpose of trademark law.43 
Traditionally, as I have described in previous works,44 trademark 
protection has been based on the position that the primary function of 
trademark law is to safeguard consumers and market welfare.45  Based 
upon this premise, trademarks are theoretically protected only as con-
veyers of commercial information to the public46 as long as their impro-
per use is likely to confuse the public about the origin of the marked 
products.47  Based upon the same interpretation, trademark law protects 
trademark owners’ goodwill merely as a secondary concern, and ulti-
mately only to safeguard the fairness of competition in the market to the 
advantage of all competitors, rather than for the benefit of individual 
trademark owners.48  These limits on the extent of protection have histor-
                                                                                                                                      
 42. See Keating, supra note 9, at 379 (noting that in the context of promotional trademark licens-
ing the “statutory requirement that the defendant’s use of the mark on goods must cause confusion, 
mistake or deception” does not have to “necessarily relate to the source of the product”); see also 
Anne Field, How to Knock Out Knock Offs, BUS. WK. SMALLBIZ, Spring, 2005, at 71, 71–76 (discuss-
ing the value of trademarks and the importance for trademark owners to prevent free riding). 
 43. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 13, at 481 (“[G]eneral merchandising right[s] unmoored 
from confusion conflicts with, rather than promoting, trademark law’s procompetitive goals.”).  But see 
Denicola, supra note 27, at 641 (“Analysis of the economic implications of an exclusive merchandising 
right provides a surprisingly strong case for the trademark owner.”). 
 44. See Calboli, supra note 5, at 351; Calboli, supra note 4, at 784.  As I have done before in the 
context of trademark assignment and trademark licensing, this paragraph outlines the traditional posi-
tion on trademark protection and the tension therewith, as critical background materials for framing 
the acceptance of merchandising rights under current trademark law.  
 45. Trademark protection has traditionally been justified because marks provide information 
about the products to which they are affixed, guarantee a predictable quality, and reduce consumer 
search costs.  See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspec-
tive, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 265–66 (1987) (“[T]rademark law . . . best can be explained on the hypothesis 
that the law is trying to promote economic efficiency.”); see also Nicholas S. Economides, The Eco-
nomics of Trademarks, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 523, 526 (1988); William P. Kratzke, Normative Econom-
ic Analysis of Trademark Law, 21 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REV. 199, 205 (1991). 
 46. The acquisition of trademark rights is centered upon the concepts of “distinctiveness” and 
“priority” and is limited to marks that are in use or are intended to be used.  See Lanham Act § 1, 15 
U.S.C. § 1051 (2006); see also Zazú Designs v. L’Oreal, S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 1992) (“By 
insisting that firms use marks to obtain rights in them, the law prevents entrepreneurs from reserving 
brand names in order to make their rivals’ marketing more costly.”); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. 
Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 16:11. 
 47. For a detailed overview of the standard of “likelihood of confusion” for trademark infringe-
ment and “likelihood of dilution” for dilution of famous marks, see infra Part III.B.  
 48. S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 4 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1274, provides the fol-
lowing introduction to the Lanham Act: “Trade-marks, indeed, are the essence of competition, be-
cause they make possible a choice between competing articles by enabling the buyer to distinguish one 
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ically been justified by the social cost of trademarks, that is, the right to 
exclude other parties from using identical or similar words or symbols for 
a virtually unlimited time period, and the corresponding risk in creating 
an undesirable monopoly over language and other forms of expression, 
should such protection extend to marks “in gross” rather than as convey-
ers of information and indicators of commercial origin.49 
Despite this traditional account, the position that trademarks consti-
tute important business assets, and accordingly should be protected “in 
gross” as property of their owners, has always played an important role 
in the conduct of trade in the commercial world.50  Trademark protection 
started precisely based on the premise that trademarks were property of 
their owners that should be protected against the trespass of unscru-
pulous competitors.51  Common law courts initially based their jurisdic-
tion over infringers on defending trademark owners from the invasion of 
their property and did not require proof of consumer confusion.52  Courts 
rejected this position in favor of a confusion-based protection in the early 
twentieth century,53 and the adoption of the Lanham Act in 1946 codified 
this judicial approach into law.54  The pressure to directly protect trade-
                                                                                                                                      
from the other.  Trade-marks encourage the maintenance of quality by securing to the producer the 
benefit of the good reputation which excellence creates.” 
 49. For similar considerations, see Calboli, supra note 5, at 352; Calboli, supra note 4, at 777. For 
a detailed analysis of the monopolistic effect of trademarks, see GEORGE J. ALEXANDER, HONESTY 
AND COMPETITION: FALSE-ADVERTISING LAW AND POLICY UNDER FTC ADMINISTRATION 25–27 
(1967); EDWARD CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 204–08 (1933); A.G. 
Papandreou, The Economic Effect of Trademarks, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 503, 505 (1956); see also Avery & 
Sons v. Meikle & Co., 81 Ky. 73, 102 (1883). 
 50. See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 
818 (1927).  Schechter imported into the United States the idea originally developed in Germany in 
the late 1800s by Joseph Koeler, one of the patriarchs of intellectual property law, that trademarks 
should be protected against “diluting” unauthorized uses.  Id. (“The true functions of the trademark 
are, then, to identify a product as satisfactory and thereby to stimulate further purchases by the con-
suming public.”). 
 51. See Daniel M. McClure, Trademarks and Unfair Competition: A Critical History of Legal 
Thought, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 305, 314–16 (1979) (“The development of trademark law in Ameri-
ca . . . developed as an offshoot of the tort of fraud and deceit, and was called ‘passing off.’”); see also 
Beverly W. Pattishall, Two Hundred Years of American Trademark Law, 68 TRADEMARK REP. 121, 
123–33 (1978).  Courts based trademark protection on natural rights, arguing that trademark owners 
acquired the property of their marks through possession and control.  Edward S. Rogers, Comments 
on the Modern Law of Unfair Trade, 3 ILL. L. REV. 551, 552–54 (1909) (offering a detailed analysis of 
relevant decisions until the early 1900s).  In the Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879), the Supreme 
Court also referred to the right to use a mark as “a property right.”  Id. at 92. 
 52. To avoid private appropriation of common words and symbols, courts divided trademarks 
into two groups: “technical marks,” or newly created words or logos, which could be protected without 
consumer confusion, and other marks based upon existing common terms, which could be protected 
only against unfair competition and required proof of confusion.  See JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, THE 
LAW OF TRADEMARKS, TRADENAMES, AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 8–11 (2d ed. 1905) (highlighting 
the natural principles for their protection). 
 53. For a reconstruction of this judicial shift, see Calboli, supra note 4, at 799–803. 
 54. This position is reflected in a famous passage in the Senate Reports.  See S. REP. NO. 79-
1333, at 3–6 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1274. 
The purpose underlying any trade-mark statute is twofold.  One is to protect the public so it may be 
confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular trade-mark which it favorably knows, it 
will get the product which it asks for and wants to get.  Secondly, where the owner of a trade-mark 
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marks per se, however, has never abandoned trademark practice and 
trademark owners have often continued to use marks as “things”55 in the 
course of trade, either because of a “widespread ignorance” of the law or 
by “making the most of [its] exceptions.”56 
In the past half century, the pervasiveness of this property approach 
for trademark protection has scored unprecedented victories in the legal 
world.  Not surprisingly, this new wave of trademark protectionism has 
been driven primarily by the unprecedented increase in mass production 
and distribution of consumer goods.57  As a result, recent revisions of the 
trademark statute have expanded the protection of trademark goodwill 
and trademarks per se,58 thus reigniting the discussion over the scope of 
trademark protection—should trademark law protect the public or safe-
guard producers’ interests against trespass?  Several courts have joined 
this trend by stating that marks, in particular famous marks, could be 
protected beyond consumer confusion, and on the sole basis of the im-
pairment of the marks.59  As detailed below, these statutory and judicial 
developments have contributed to creating a fertile environment for a 
growing acceptance of trademark merchandising by courts. 
B. The Evolving Role of Trademarks and the Birth of Trademark 
Merchandising 
As in most areas of the law, the role of trademarks and their regula-
tion must be understood within the “social context and economic setting” 
of a particular time period.60  Hence, to comprehend the growing favor 
                                                                                                                                      
has spent energy, time, and money in presenting to the public the product, he is protected in his in-
vestment from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats. 
Id. at 3. 
 55. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 
YALE L.J. 1687, 1687–88 (1999). 
 56. Nathan Isaacs, Traffic in Trade-Symbols, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1210, 1210 (1931). 
 57. See Calboli, supra note 5, at 352; Calboli, supra note 4, at 777; see also David J. Franklyn, 
Debunking Dilution Doctrine: Toward a Coherent Theory of the Anti-Free-Rider Principle in American 
Trademark Law, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 117, 122–23 (2005) (noting that the Industrial Revolution changed 
the marketplace and subsequently required changes to trademark law). 
 58. The most relevant expansion of trademark law in this sense has been the adoption of the 
FTDA in 1995, which codified into law the protection of famous marks against dilution.  Lanham Act 
§§ 43(c), 45, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127 (2006).  But see Kenneth L. Port, The “Unnatural” Expansion 
of Trademark Rights: Is a Federal Dilution Statute Necessary?, 85 TRADEMARK REP. 525, 549–51 
(1995) (criticizing the adoption of the FTDA). 
 59. See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 485 U.S. 176, 185 (1988) (stating that trademark protection 
“confers private rights”); S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 532 (1987) 
(citations omitted) (recognizing “a limited property right” because of “the expenditure of labor, skill, 
and money”); Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton 189 F.3d 868, 875 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that dilu-
tion “tread[s] very close to granting ‘rights in gross’ in a trademark”); Krebs Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. 
Valley Motors, Inc., 141 F.3d 490, 498 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that “[t]rademarks are property” and be-
long to an estate in the case of bankruptcy); Dall. Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, 
Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979) (denying First Amendment defense because of the mark’s 
“property right”).  But see Lemley, supra note 55, at 1697–1700 (criticizing this judicial expansion of 
trademark protection). 
 60. For a detailed historical reconstruction of the economic and social role of trademarks, see 
Drescher, supra note 3. 
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that has characterized trademark merchandising in past decades, it is cru-
cial to understand how dynamic social contexts and economic conditions 
have transformed the traditional functions of marks from their first usage 
to today.61 
Although the use of trademarks dates back to the beginning of 
trade, the role of marks has profoundly changed since the first signs were 
used in antiquity.62  As jurists and historians have documented, trade-
marks were initially used almost exclusively to identify product manufac-
turers as indicators of commercial origin, even if they occasionally served 
also as symbols of manufacturers’ goodwill for consumers located in dif-
ferent geographical areas.63  The advent of the Middle Ages and the crea-
tion of guilds brought to trademarks the additional function of certifica-
tion of quality.  Guild members had to affix to their products both the 
guild mark, to certify compliance with guild standards and the member’s 
individual mark, to indicate commercial origin and also to guarantee the 
quality of the individual products.64 
This system, where marks operated as signs of commercial origin 
and guarantees of quality, continued more or less untouched until the 
end of the nineteenth century.65  Then, the Industrial Revolution in the 
late 1800s brought unprecedented changes and growth in production and 
distribution.  The advent of product packaging and advertising prompted 
manufacturers to rely on their marks as general advertising tools for their 
products against competitors.66  In response to the growing numbers of 
similar and interchangeable products available in the market, manufac-
turers started to employ trademarks not just as indicators of source, but 
also as vehicles to connote positive ideals about the products they identi-
fied.67  In this modernized market system, trademarks thus evolved from 
                                                                                                                                      
 61. Id. at 301–03. 
 62. For a historical discussion on the ancient role of trademarks, see Benjamin G. Paster, 
Trademarks—Their Early History, 59 TRADEMARK REP. 551 (1969); Gerald Ruston, On the Origin of 
Trademarks, 45 TRADEMARK REP. 127 (1955). 
 63. Drescher, supra note 3, at 310.  See generally Edward S. Rogers, Some Historical Matter Con-
cerning Trade-Marks, 9 MICH. L. REV. 29 (1910) (reviewing trademark developments from ancient 
Egypt to the early twentieth century in the United States); Ruston, supra note 62 (surveying the histo-
ry of trademarks from potters in Egypt to the advent of a compulsory system of marking in England). 
 64. See Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1839, 1850 (2007) (noting that guilds required “members to affix distinguishing marks to their 
products so they could police their ranks effectively”); Paster, supra note 62, at 556 (detailing that in 
the Middle Ages, trade and craft guilds “promulgated regulations to control the activities of [their] 
members”). 
 65. See SCHECHTER, supra note 1, at 140; Sidney A. Diamond, The Historical Development of 
Trademarks, 73 TRADEMARK REP. 222, 264 (1983). 
 66. See Drescher, supra note 3, at 322–25 (pointing to QUAKER oats as an example of this phe-
nomenon).  “The industrial revolution was characterized by an enormous growth of industry as mod-
ern manufacturing methods replaced the handwork of older times. . . . Along with the growth of distri-
bution came the use of advertising to acquaint the consuming public with the availability of the 
goods.”  Diamond, supra note 65, at 237. 
 67. As Drescher explains: 
By 1942, the value of trademarks as commercial symbols had advanced so far that Justice 
Frankfurter was able to observe in Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge that the 
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simple indicators of source and quality into advertising tools, messengers, 
and overall symbols for the marked products.68  In other words, trade-
marks became brands.69 
This newly developed advertising function of trademarks continued 
to grow in the following decades thanks to improvements in the economy 
as well as communication and advertising techniques.  The rise of a more 
affluent middle class, the availability of affordable consumer products, 
and the growing number of home televisions only magnified the impor-
tance of trademarks, which transformed from symbols of products also 
into symbols of status and experiences—the mark JEEP, for example, no 
longer indicated merely sports vehicles to consumers, but also outdoor 
living, freedom, and independence.70  Not surprisingly, the business world 
quickly realized the importance of this attractive power of marks.  Start-
ing in the 1960s, manufacturers began using marks on a variety of prod-
ucts that could contribute to their overall brand experience—JEEP lug-
gage, sports equipment, etc.—while simultaneously building trademark 
affiliation and creating revenues.71  The establishment of licensing and 
production outsourcing greatly facilitated this exploitation of trademark 
value.72  As a result, trademark merchandising as a business technique 
was born. 
Soon, this trend seemed irreversible.  An increasing number of 
companies started to branch off their traditional sectors to sell or distri-
                                                                                                                                      
owner of a mark makes “every effort to impregnate the atmosphere of the market with the draw-
ing power of a congenial symbol.” 
Drescher, supra note 3, at 328 (alteration in original) (quoting Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. 
v. S.S. Kresge, 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942)). 
 68. For a detailed reconstruction of the development of advertising and the role of marks, see 
DANIEL POPE, THE MAKING OF MODERN ADVERTISING 68–69 (1983). 
 69. See, e.g., AL RIES & LAURA RIES, THE FALL OF ADVERTISING AND THE RISE OF PR 62 
(2002) (“A brand is a name that stands for something positive in the [consumer’s] mind.”); John Die-
fenbach, The Corporate Identity As the Brand, in BRANDING: A KEY MARKETING TOOL 159 (John M. 
Murphy ed., 1987) (“[A] brand dominant system is one in which the individual brands are dominant, 
and the corporation behind them is subordinate (sometimes anonymous) in most communications.”); 
The Year of the Brand, ECONOMIST, Dec. 24, 1988, at 96 (providing several examples of brand acquisi-
tions). 
 70. Drescher describes this phenomenon as follows: 
Using Chrysler’s JEEP mark as an example, we can chart some of the cultural factors involved in a 
brand extension: MARK: JEEP[;] MYTH: Great Outdoors; war[;] VALUES/THEME: Indepen-
dence, freedom, unspoiled nature, overcome obstacles, American ‘can-do’ attitude[;] CORE 
PRODUCT: Four wheel drive vehicle[;] CULTURAL SUBSYSTEM: Recreational travel; rugged 
adventure[;] POSSIBLE EXTENSIONS: Cosmetics, soaps, deodorant; towels & bedding for camp-
ing; tents & hammocks; sleeping bags; leather handbags & luggage; sports equipment, including 
rods & reels, skis & ski-poles. 
Drescher, supra note 3, at 332.  
 71. See David J. Franklyn, Toward a Coherent Theory of Strict Liability for Trademark Licen-
sors, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 13 n.53 (1998) (“Promotional trademark licensing mushroomed in the 
1970s, led by ‘such famous merchandising forerunners as BUSTER BROWN, RAGGEDY ANN, 
SHIRLEY TEMPLE, BATMAN and ROBIN and MICKEY MOUSE’ . . . .” (quoting Alfred M. 
Marks, Trademark Licensing—Towards a More Flexible Standard, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 641, 646–47 
(1988))). 
 72. See Calboli, supra note 5, at 360–64 (tracing the history of the acceptance of trademark li-
censing in American trademark law). 
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bute complimentary promotional or collateral products bearing their 
marks.73  Almost immediately, sports teams, universities, and other enti-
ties joined businesses realizing the importance of merchandising for the 
management—financial and otherwise—of their image in the market.74  
Since then, the popularity of merchandising in the business world has 
continued to escalate and the use of marks on promotional products has 
become a reality almost everywhere.  As in the past, several social and 
economic changes contributed to this tendency—the rise of consumer-
ism, the globalization of trade and manufacturing, and the information 
technology revolution.75  These changes confirmed the importance of 
brands and brand awareness, often leading companies to rely on trade-
marks as the most valuable assets for survival in the global economy.76  
Not surprisingly, these important economic changes ultimately reached 
courts and Congress, resulting in enhanced trademark protection and 
mounting support for merchandising rights. 
1. Judicial Creation of Merchandising Rights 
The above mentioned transformation of the traditional role of 
marks strongly impacted the position of courts and legislators on trade-
mark merchandising.  Starting in the 1970s, a growing number of courts 
began to acknowledge the rights of trademark owners to prevent the dis-
tribution of unauthorized promotional products, primarily when trade-
mark owners had in place authorized licensing activities.77  Officially, 
trademark merchandising was “born” in 1975, with the famous Fifth Cir-
cuit decision in Boston Professional Hockey Association v. Dallas Cap & 
Emblem Manufacturing.78  In that case, the Fifth Circuit reversed the dis-
                                                                                                                                      
 73. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 13, at 472 (“[T]he 1970s and 1980s were an era of awaken-
ing, in which trademark holders came to realize the economic value of their marks on merchandise 
and the revenues that they could earn through licensing . . . .”); see also David Kiley, Best Global 
Brands: How the BusinessWeek/Interbrand Top 100 Companies Are Using Their Brands to Fuel Ex-
pansion, BUS. WK., Aug. 7, 2006, at 54. 
 74. “Some of the sports leagues may have come to this realization a bit earlier [than the 1970s 
and 1980s].  The National Football League, for example, established NFL Properties in 1963 expressly 
‘to act as [a] licensing representative for the trademarks and other commercial identifications of the 
member clubs.’”  Dogan & Lemley, supra note 13, at 472 n.41 (quoting Nat’l Football League Props., 
Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 651, 655 (W.D. Wash. 1982)). 
 75. See, e.g., 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 3:12 (highlighting the advertising function of trade-
marks in the modern economy).  
 76. See Alexander Krasnikov et al., Evaluating the Financial Impact of Branding Using Trade-
marks: A Framework and Empirical Evidence, 73 J. MARKETING 154, 156 (2009) (finding that both 
brand-identification trademarks and brand-association trademarks “provide significant value to 
firms”); Robert Berner, The New Alchemy at Sears, BUS. WK., Apr. 16, 2007, at 58 (“Sears has created 
$1.8 billion worth of securities based on the brand names Kenmore, Craftsman, and DieHard.”); see 
also Untangling Intangibles: Company Balance Sheets, ECONOMIST, Feb. 8, 1992, at 84 (“Putting the 
Coca-Cola logo on a can of drink, or a Mars wrapper around a bar of chocolate, raises at a stroke the 
price that can be charged for the product.”). 
 77. See, e.g., 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 24:10 (tracing the history of judicial decisions on 
merchandising rights). 
 78. Bos. Prof’l Hockey Ass’n v. Dall. Cap & Emblem Mfg., 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. 
denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975). 
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trict court, which denied relief because of the absence of confusion,79 and 
found trademark infringement solely on the basis of the association be-
tween consumers and the plaintiff’s mark80—the “triggering mechanism 
for the sale” of the defendant’s products.81   
Because of this sudden departure from the traditional infringement 
standard of consumer confusion, however, Boston Professional Hockey 
was not directly followed by other courts at the time.82  Still, the growing 
importance of merchandising in the economy brought another court to 
rule on a similar case, with a similar result, within a few months of Bos-
ton Professional Hockey.  In 1975, the Illinois Court of Appeals found 
infringement in National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Consumer 
Enterprises,83 a case involving the sale of unauthorized products bearing 
the logos of sports teams.84  Splitting from the Fifth Circuit, however, the 
court required confusion for its finding of infringement,85 yet the court 
ultimately proposed a broader interpretation of confusion that clearly 
departed from the past.  Notably, the court stated that confusion could 
also include the “sponsorship” of the products, that is, the fact that the 
                                                                                                                                      
 79. Bos. Prof’l Hockey Ass’n v. Dall. Cap & Emblem Mfg., 360 F. Supp. 459, 462–63 (N.D. Tex. 
1973), rev’d, 510 F.2d 1004.  “The test is not whether the products in question are duplications of their 
marks, but whether the defendant’s use of [them] would mislead the public as to the source of the 
goods.”  Id. at 462–63.  The district court, however, issued a limited injunction requiring that defen-
dants disclaim any association with the teams.  Id. at 465. 
 80. Bos. Prof’l Hockey, 510 F.2d at 1012.  The court based its decision on three arguments: 
(1) the commercial value of the logos was created by plaintiffs’ efforts; (2) defendant sought a license 
and, if obtained, would have enforced it against infringers; and (3) selling reproductions of trademarks 
per se on emblems is an accepted use for sports teams.  Id. at 1011.  The court acknowledged that its 
decision “may slightly tilt the trademark laws from the purpose of protecting the public to the protec-
tion of the business interests of plaintiffs. . . .”  Id. 
 81. Id. at 1012.  “The argument that confusion must be as to the source of the manufacture of the 
emblem itself is unpersuasive, where the trademark, originated by the team, is the triggering mechan-
ism for the sale of the emblem.”  Id. (emphasis added).  For a position favoring this approach, see 
Frank P. Presta, The Boston Professional Hockey Association Case and Related Cases—A Step in the 
Right Direction, 66 TRADEMARK REP. 131 (1976). 
 82. See, e.g., United States v. Giles, 213 F.3d 1247, 1250 (10th Cir. 2000) (stating that the Fifth 
Circuit in Boston Professional Hockey relied “upon a novel and overly broad conception of the rights 
that a trademark entails”); Int’l Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 919 (9th 
Cir. 1980) (defining Boston Professional Hockey as “an extraordinary extension of the protection . . . 
afforded trademark owners”); Ky. Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 
388 (5th Cir. 1977) (“Trademark infringement occurs only when the use sought to be enjoined is likely 
to confuse purchasers with respect to such things as the product’s source, its endorsement by the plain-
tiff, or its connection with the plaintiff.”); Bd. of Governors of Univ. of N.C. v. Helpingstine, 714 F. 
Supp. 167, 173 (M.D. N.C. 1989) (“[Plaintiff] must provide evidence establishing that individuals do 
make the critical distinction as to sponsorship or endorsement, or direct evidence of actual confu-
sion.”). 
 83. Nat’l Football League Props., Inc. v. Consumer Enters., Inc., 327 N.E.2d 242 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1975). 
 84. Id. at 246–47.  “([W]e reject defendant’s contention that no trademark infringement has oc-
curred because the emblems are merely decorative ornaments . . . . [W]e conclude that the trademarks 
of the teams copied by defendant indicate sponsorship or origin in addition to their ornamental val-
ue.”). 
 85. Id. at 245–46 (“[A]n unauthorized use of another’s valid trademark, which use is likely to 
cause confusion as to the origin of the goods, may be completely enjoined.”). 
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public, while aware that plaintiffs did not manufacture the products, 
could believe that they had sponsored or endorsed them.86 
During the next decade, courts increasingly accepted this broader 
concept of confusion, even when they denied trademark infringement.  
In 1980, in International Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co.,87 
the Ninth Circuit stated that the unauthorized use of fraternal emblems 
did not amount to infringement because their use was ornamental.88  Still, 
the court conceded that logos could function both as ornament and 
product source if consumers “inferred from the insignia that the jewelry 
was produced, sponsored or endorsed” by plaintiff.89  In 1982, the Fifth 
Circuit itself excluded infringement in Supreme Assembly, Order of 
Rainbow for Girls v. J.H. Ray Jewelry Co.,90 but it drew a distinction be-
tween fraternal emblems91 and sports logos, where “consumer[s] seeing 
the emblem or name of a team . . . would assume some sort of sponsor-
ship.”92  Confusion as to sponsorship, or lack thereof, was also at the 
heart of the 1983 Third Circuit decision in University of Pittsburgh v. 
Champion Products Inc.,93 where the court denied infringement because 
unlicensed merchandise had been sold for over forty years and consum-
ers did not seem to attach importance to their sponsor or endorser.94 
Courts continued to adopt the same approach in following years 
and, probably because of the above mentioned economic changes, their 
rulings turned increasingly favorable toward plaintiffs’ claims in mer-
chandising cases.  In 1985 in University of Georgia Athletic Association v. 
Laite,95 the Eleventh Circuit seemingly followed Boston Professional 
Hockey and found infringement solely because of the “public’s know-
ledge that the trademark . . . originate[d] with the plaintiff.”96  Although 
                                                                                                                                      
 86. Id. at 246 (“[T]he buying public has come to associate the trademark with the sponsorship of 
the NFL or of the particular member team involved.”). 
 87. Job’s Daughters, 633 F.2d at 919. 
 88. Id. at 917 (“Trademark law does not prevent a person from copying so-called ‘functional’ 
features of a product which constitute the actual benefit that the consumer wishes to purchase, as dis-
tinguished from an assurance that a particular entity made, sponsored, or endorsed a product.”); see 
also Denicola, supra note 27, at 619–20 (“Several decisions have . . . invoked the functionality doctrine 
to support their refusal to enjoin the ornamental use of another’s mark, while others have declined to 
extend aesthetic functionality to design features whose appeal rests on the associations they con-
jure.”).  But see In re Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 565 F.2d 679, 681 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (“[P]ossession of a func-
tion and of a capability of indicating origin are not in every case mutually exclusive.”). 
 89. Job’s Daughters, 633 F.2d at 919. 
 90. 676 F.2d 1079, 1082 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 91. Id. at 1083  (“[M]ost fraternal associations exercise little control over the manufacture of the 
jewelry bearing their fraternal emblems . . . .”). 
 92. Id. at 1085. 
 93. 686 F.2d 1040, 1048 (3d Cir. 1982). 
 94. Id. at 1047 (“[T]here is no consumer confusion in the traditional sense.  No one would se-
riously assert that a significant segment of the public believes that Pitt actually manufactured the 
goods involved.”). 
 95. 756 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir. 1985). 
 96. Id. at 1546 (citations omitted) (“‘[C]onfusion’ need not relate to the origin of the challenged 
product.  Rather, ‘confusion’ may relate to the public’s knowledge that the trademark, which is ‘the 
triggering mechanism’ for the sale of the product, originates with the plaintiff.”). 
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the court mentioned the need for confusion in its decision, it eventually 
equated confusion with simple mental association or recognition of the 
mark while emphasizing, as the decisive factor for its conclusion, the de-
fendant’s desire to free ride on plaintiff’s goodwill.97  In 1989, in Boston 
Athletic Association v. Sullivan,98 the First Circuit adopted a similar con-
clusion and weighed misappropriation and free riding of plaintiff’s 
goodwill, far beyond product confusion, against the defendant in finding 
infringement.99 
This trend of favorable decisions also continued to characterize 
merchandising cases through the 1990s and the turn of the century.  
More recently, in 2006, in two separate cases, Audi AG v. D’Amato100 and 
Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.,101 the Sixth Cir-
cuit and the Ninth Circuit, respectively, both ruled that the unauthorized 
sale of promotional goods bearing the marks of a car manufacturer 
amounted to trademark infringement.102  The same year, in Texas Tech 
University v. Spiegelberg,103 the Northern District of Texas granted plain-
tiff’s relief and presumed confusion because defendant used identical, or 
nearly identical, colors and logos without an official license, and plaintiffs 
had long-established licensing agreements.104  In 2008, in Board of Super-
visors of Louisiana State University v. Smack Apparel Co.,105 the Fifth 
Circuit went even further and enjoined defendant from selling “Sugar 
Bowl” t-shirts bearing the color schemes and slogans associated with 
Louisiana State University, solely because of likely consumer associa-
tion.106  The same year, in University of Kansas v. Sinks,107 the District 
                                                                                                                                      
 97. Id. at 1547  (“[A]s in Boston Hockey, the confusion stems not from the defendant’s unfair 
competition with the plaintiff’s products, but from the defendant’s misuse of the plaintiff’s reputation 
and good will as embodied in the plaintiff’s mark.”); see also Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 
F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir. 1987) (enjoining defendant from selling t-shirts bearing the phrase “Mutant of 
Omaha” because “approximately ten percent of all persons surveyed thought that Mutual ‘[went] 
along’ with [the] products”  (citation omitted)). 
 98. 867 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1989). 
 99. Id. at 33 (“[U]nlicensed use of BAA’s mark would permit defendant to ‘reap where [they 
have] not sown.’” (citation omitted)).  But see Bd. of Governors of Univ. of N.C. v. Helpingstine, 714 
F. Supp. 167, 173 (M.D.N.C. 1989) (“[S]imilarity or even identity of marks is not sufficient to establish 
confusion where non-competitive goods are involved, and the court also rejects the position that intent 
to capitalize on popularity is sufficient to establish infringement.”). 
 100. 469 F.3d 534 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 101. 457 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Gen. Motors v. Lanard Toys, Inc. 468 F.3d 405, 420 
(6th Cir. 2006) (ruling the unauthorized sale of toys resembling the HUMMER vehicle produced by 
GM were infringing upon GM’s trade dress). 
 102. See Audi AG, 469 F.3d at 539; Au-Tomotive, 457 F.3d at 1078. 
 103. 461 F. Supp. 2d 510 (N.D. Tex. 2006). 
 104. Id. at 521–23.  On the problems of extending merchandising protection to colors, see Jere-
miah Kline, Black and Blue: An Examination of Trademarking University Color Schemes, 16 SPORTS 
LAW. J. 47 (2009); Gerald T. Tschura, Likelihood of Confusion and Expressive Functionality: A Fresh 
Look at the Ornamental Use of Institutional Colors, Names and Emblems on Apparel and Other 
Goods, 53 WAYNE L. REV. 873, 884 (2007).  
 105. Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Co. v. Smack Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 
465 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 106. Id. at 478 (stressing that the public would “perceive the university as the source or sponsor of 
the goods because [consumers] want to associate with that source”).  But see Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs. 
v. New Life Art Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1240 (N.D. Ala. 2009).  In this case, the court denied that 
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Court of Kansas similarly found that defendant’s t-shirts, using marks 
strikingly similar to plaintiff’s marks, were infringing.108  Still, despite fa-
voring trademark merchandising de facto, no court has officially framed 
merchandising rights in the legal context, thus leaving room for different 
interpretations on a case-by-case basis.109 
2. Protecting Merchandising Rights via the Trademark Statute? 
In addition to influencing courts’ decisions, the above mentioned 
changes in the economy also deeply impacted the statutory regulation of 
trademarks in past decades.  In particular, the adoption of the Trade-
mark Revision Act of 1988 introduced the concept of “confusion as to 
the sponsorship” directly into the Lanham Act as a type of consumer 
confusion for the infringement of unregistered trademarks.110  As elabo-
rated above, courts had already applied the same standard to the in-
fringement of registered marks under section 32(1)(a) of the Lanham 
Act since the 1960s.111  Following this line of reasoning, the 1988 amend-
ment changed the text of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, which now 
provides that anyone can prohibit the “use” by any person of “any word, 
term, name, symbol, or device” that “is likely to cause confusion, or to 
cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or associa-
tion of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, 
or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by 
another person” when he or she “believes that he or she is or is likely to 
be damaged by such act.”112 
As a result of this change, trademark owners can now legitimately 
prohibit any use of their marks, whether registered or not, on products 
that consumers can “reasonably” think of as being related with “the 
same source, or thought to be affiliated with, connected with, or spon-
sored by, trademark owner[s].”113  Not surprisingly, this change in the 
trademark statute in favor of a broader infringement standard directly 
added to the already benevolent attitude of the judiciary toward the rec-
                                                                                                                                      
the university had a protectable interest in the color of its football team’s uniform with respect to artis-
tic painting but specified that the artist could not reproduce the university’s marks in his painting nor 
reduce and sell its works as promotional products.  Id. 
 107. 565 F. Supp. 2d 1216 (D. Kan. 2008). 
 108. Id. at 1254–55 (finding infringement for the “[t]-shirts that the Court has singled out as dis-
playing marks that are overwhelmingly similar to KU’s marks”).  The court, however, rejected infring-
ing claims for those t-shirts with designs not remarkably similar and acknowledged defendant’s use of 
disclaimers to avoid confusion.  Id. 
 109. See, e.g., James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 
YALE L.J. 882, 908 (2007) (discussing the uncertainty of judicial outcomes in merchandising cases). 
 110. Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, sec. 132, § 43(a), 102 Stat. 3935, 
3946 (Nov. 16, 1988) (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141n (2006)). 
 111. Lanham Act § 32(1)(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a). 
 112. Lanham Act § 43(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1). 
 113. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 24:6 (noting that “the modern rule of law” gives trade-
mark owners protection against any “related goods or services”). 
CALBOLI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/26/2011  1:54 PM 
No. 3] TRADEMARK MERCHANDISING 885 
ognition of merchandising rights.114  After the adoption of the 1988 
amendment, as long as trademark owners can prove that consumers 
would likely, and erroneously, connect with trademark owners the unau-
thorized use of their marks on goods, services, or activities carried out by 
third parties, and that this use could likely damage trademark owners, 
such use has to be prohibited and considered infringing under the rule of 
the trademark statute.115 
Finally, a further push toward the statutory recognition and protec-
tion of merchandising came from the adoption of the Federal Trademark 
Dilution Act (FTDA) in 1995.116  A concept long known in U.S. trade-
mark theory,117 and already widely accepted by state trademark laws,118 
protection against trademark dilution was introduced into section 43(c) 
of the Lanham Act to “expand federal trademark protection beyond the 
traditional protection against consumer confusion.”119  Specifically, the 
new provision aims at recognizing the protection for “famous” marks 
against either the “blurring” of their distinctiveness or the “tarnishment” 
of their reputation, which could be caused by unauthorized uses of iden-
tical or similar marks not solely on related but also on unrelated prod-
ucts.120  Furthermore, as clarified by Congress in the 2006 Trademark Di-
lution Revision Act (TDRA)121 and, contrary to the position suggested by 
                                                                                                                                      
 114. The passing of the 1988 Trademark Revision Act underlined Congress’ commitment to pro-
tect trademark goodwill in addition to consumers.  See S. REP. NO. 100-515, at 4 (1988), reprinted in 
1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5580 (“America stakes its reputation on its trademarks.  They are the most 
important ambassadors of goodwill America will ever send abroad.”). 
 115. Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prod., 353 F.3d 792, 80607 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omit-
ted); see, e.g., Champions Golf Club, Inc. v. The Champions Golf Club, Inc., 78 F.3d 1111, 1122 (6th 
Cir. 1996); Dall. Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 205 (2d Cir. 
1979).  But see Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33 (2003) (limiting the 
interpretation of commercial “origin” to those instances where marks are affixed to products). 
 116. Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104–98, §§ 3(a), 4, 109 Stat. 
985, 985–86 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125, 1127) (effective Jun. 16, 1996); see Terry 
Ahearn, Dilution by Blurring Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: What Is It and How 
Is It Shown?, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 893, 901–03 (2001) (noting that the FTDA was an attempt by 
Congress to develop uniformity for the varying state antidilution statutes).  
 117. See Schechter, supra note 50, at 818. 
 118. The first state antidilution statute was adopted in Massachusetts in 1947.  See Robert N. 
Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 
U. PITT. L. REV. 789, 811 (1997).  Subsequently, several other states adopted state antidilution statutes 
prior the adoption of the FTDA.  Id. at 812–13.  For a general discussion of dilution protection before 
the FTDA, see Walter J. Derenberg, The Problem of Trademark Dilution and the Antidilution Statutes, 
44 CALIF. L. REV. 439 (1956). 
 119. Jesse A. Hofrichter, Note, Tool of the Trademark: Brand Criticism and Free Speech Problems 
with the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1923, 1935 (2007). 
 120. The FTDA, as amended by the TDRA of 2006, defines “blurring” as an “association arising 
from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness 
of the famous mark.”  Lanham Act § 43(c)(2)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B).  “Tarnishment” is de-
fined as an “association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark 
that harms the reputation of the famous mark.”  Id. § 1125(c)(2)(C).  The FTDA also provides that “a 
mark is famous if it is widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United States as a de-
signation of source of the goods or services of the mark’s owner.”  Id. § 1125(c)(2)(A). 
 121. Trademark Dilution Revision Act (TDRA) of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312 §§ 2, 3(e), 120 Stat. 
1730 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125, 1127) (effective Oct. 6, 2006); see, e.g., Hofrichter, 
supra note 119, at 1938.  
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the Supreme Court in Moseley v. Victoria Secret Catalogue, Inc.,122 dilu-
tion claims can be based on a “likelihood of harm” or “likelihood of dilu-
tion” of the marks rather than on a likelihood of confusion on the part of 
the public without the need to prove any “actual harm” or “actual dilu-
tion.”123 
Once again, these changes confirmed the willingness of the legisla-
ture to grant trademark owners strong protection against unauthorized 
uses of trademarks—particularly for famous marks.  Notably, following 
the adoption of section 43(c) of the Lanham Act, owners of famous 
marks can claim blurring or tarnishment of their marks when third par-
ties used identical or similar signs on any products, related or not, with-
out their consent, regardless of the existence of any type of confusion.124  
As expected, despite the general criticism of trademark scholars against 
this unnatural expansion of trademark protection, trademark owners 
have repeatedly used this cause of action in the past several years to en-
join the use of famous marks on promotional or collateral products.125  
Although opponents of merchandising rights have repeatedly stressed 
that dilution provisions should not provide relief in merchandising cases, 
several courts have confirmed the validity of these claims and affirmed 
protection against dilution with respect to the use of famous marks on 
unauthorized promotional products.126 
IV. THE CURRENT UNCLEAR STATUS OF TRADEMARK 
MERCHANDISING 
Even if recent decisions, the 1988 amendment to the Lanham Act, 
and the adoption of a federal antidilution law indicate that recognizing 
trademark rights on promotional products has become the status quo in 
most courts and among legislators, the acceptance of this practice re-
                                                                                                                                      
 122. 537 U.S. 418, 433–34 (2003).  This decision attempted to resolve a circuit split under the 1996 
FTDA between the Fourth Circuit, requesting plaintiff to prove specific harm to assess dilution, and 
the Second Circuit, holding that a successful plaintiff needed only prove a “likelihood of dilution.”  
Compare Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 222–23 (2d Cir. 1999), with Ringling Bros.-
Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 461 (4th Cir. 1999).  
The Supreme Court’s decision in Moseley confirmed the need for specific harm rather than a “likeli- 
hood of dilution.”  See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433–34. 
 123. See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433–34. 
 124. See Scott Fetzer Co. v. House of Vacuums Inc., 381 F.3d 477, 489–90 (5th Cir. 2004) (infer-
ring that confusion is not determinative under dilution).  A traditional concern in dilution cases was 
whether the marks were adequately famous since, prior to the TDRA, the FTDA did not include a 
definition of “famous mark” and courts occasionally protected marks which were famous only in small 
segments of the market or in limited geographic locations.  But see TCPIP Holding Co., Inc., v. Hear 
Commc’n, Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 9899 (2d Cir. 2001) (refusing to declare famous a mark which had been 
used for thirty years in 228 stores and had achieved $228 million in one year). 
 125. See infra note 126. 
 126. See, e.g., Audi AG v. D’Amato, 469 F.3d 534, 547 (6th Cir. 2006); Univ. of Kan. v. Sinks, 565 
F. Supp. 2d 1216, 125760 (D. Kan. 2008); Tex. Tech Univ. v. Spiegelberg, 461 F. Supp. 2d 510, 523–24 
(N.D. Tex. 2006).  But see Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003); 
Dogan & Lemley, supra note 13, at 499–501 (claiming that dilution would not save merchandising 
rights after the Supreme Court decision in Dastar). 
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mains controversial.  Still, most arguments in favor of or against this 
practice fail to consider that merchandising marks could legitimately 
identify commercial source and distinguish promotional products from 
similar goods and, as such, should be subjected to the current norms and 
limits set forth for all marks. 
Part IV analyzes the current debate on trademark merchandising 
with particular emphasis on the disconnect that characterizes the posi-
tions of opponents and supporters of this practice.  This Part also high-
lights the consequences that the disconnect creates in this area of the law, 
and specifically the ongoing uncertainty as to whether and to what extent 
merchandising practices are protected. 
A. The Disconnected Debate on Merchandising Rights 
As mentioned before, considering the emergence of merchandised 
products in every aspect of our lives, not many would doubt that this re-
markable business technique also enjoys legal protection.  Instead, un-
certainty continues to characterize the legal treatment of merchandising 
rights.127  Notably, scholars traditionally oppose the recognition of mer-
chandising rights based on the potential consequences for competition, as 
well as the danger of higher product prices.128  On the contrary, practi-
tioners and trademark owners generally support merchandising rights 
based on the unfairness of unscrupulous free riding129 and goodwill mis-
appropriation, as well as the increasing presumption on the part of the 
public that promotional products are directly sponsored by trademark 
owners.130 
Although undoubtedly detrimental for businesses and their compet-
itors, who are left in a state of uncertainty over the validity of merchan-
dising rights, these disagreements do not come as a surprise and simply 
reflect the fundamentally distinct interpretations that characterize the 
trademark debate.131  As indicated earlier, past centuries have witnessed 
major doctrinal battles over whether trademark law should directly pro-
                                                                                                                                      
 127. See discussion supra Part III.A–B. 
 128. See, e.g., Cherniak, supra note 14, at 1355 (“The public interest in encouraging free competi-
tion and curtailing monopolistic practices seems to clearly outweigh the business interest of trademark 
owners in maintaining incentive to create value in their marks.”); Paul J. Heald, Filling Two Gaps in 
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition: Mixed-Use Trademarks and the Problem with Vanna, 
47 S.C. L. REV. 783, 788 (1996) (“Granting exclusive rights in the promotional goods context permits 
monopoly pricing and, therefore, entails a transfer of wealth from consumers to trademark owners.”).  
 129. For a general discussion on the negative aspects of free riding, see Jerre B. Swann & Theo-
dore H. Davis, Jr., Dilution, an Idea Whose Time Has Gone; Brand Equity as Protectable Property, the 
New/Old Paradigm, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 219, 252–56 (1994).  But see Mark A. Lemley, Property, In-
tellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1046–69 (2005). 
 130. See, e.g., Keating, supra note 9, at 372 (“A recent survey indicated that 45.3 percent of the 
respondents believed that companies making jerseys corresponding to National Football League jer-
seys were required to obtain authorization from the NFL.”  (citing Nat’l Football League Props., Inc., 
v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 651, 658–59 (W.D. Wash. 1980))). 
 131. See supra Part III.A. 
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tect trademark goodwill132 or market competition and the public.133  Still, 
even if the latter position has emerged victorious in the early twentieth 
century—“likelihood of confusion” being the current infringement stan-
dard134—trademark practice, and the conduct of business in general, has 
never abandoned the conviction that marks belong to their owners as 
properties.135  Recent economic changes have further strengthened this 
conviction by reasserting the importance of trademarks as business as-
sets, thanks primarily to the growth of merchandising practices.136   
Ultimately, the courts and legislature have also joined this trend by 
favoring the recognition of trademark merchandising.137  Thus far, how-
ever, neither the judiciary nor Congress has explicitly framed this prac-
tice in the legal context, but instead they have simply expanded the in-
terpretation of consumer confusion to include confusion as to the 
products’ sponsorship to justify the protection of merchandising rights on 
a case-by-case basis.138  Despite the popularity of merchandising as a 
business practice, this unclear legal framework has left room for uncer-
tainty in this area.  This uncertainty has in turn exacerbated the ideologi-
cal divide between opponents and supporters of this practice.139  As this 
Article elaborates, this situation should not continue because it is nega-
tively affecting competition and concerns an unavoidable business reality 
that should be properly framed under trademark law.140 
1. Trademark Merchandising as a “Fragile Doctrine” in Trademark 
Theory 
As repeatedly noted, counter to the enthusiasm from the business 
world, trademark scholars have often criticized the judicial favor for 
merchandising rights as a “fragile theory” in trademark law.141  In particu-
                                                                                                                                      
 132. See Schechter, supra note 50, at 818 (“The true functions of the trademark are, then, to iden-
tify a product as satisfactory and thereby to stimulate further purchases by the consuming public.”); see 
also McClure, supra note 51, at 314–16. 
 133. See Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 2099, 2100 
(2004) (noting that the main purpose of trademark law is to prevent consumer confusion). 
 134. See Lanham Act §§ 32(1)(a), 43(a)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1)(a), 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
 135. See DC Comics v. Pan Am. Grain Mfg. Co., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1220, 1225 (T.T.A.B. 
2005) (finding that the applicant’s use of KRIPTONITA for alcoholic beverages was sufficiently re-
lated to the opponent’s registration of the use of KRYPTONITE on t-shirts, toys, and sporting goods).  
See generally Isaacs, supra note 56. 
 136. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 24:10 (describing the increasing importance of marks for 
businesses and the growth of merchandising). 
 137. On the evolution of the role of trademarks and its impact on trademark law and judicial deci-
sions, see discussion supra Part III.B. 
 138. See Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack Apparel Co., 550 
F.3d 465, 478 (5th Cir. 2008); Univ. of Kan. v. Sinks, 565 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1243 (D. Kan. 2008). 
 139. See Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary 
Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 167 (1992) (“A culture could not exist if all free riding were prohibited 
within it.”). 
 140. For a detailed discussion, see infra Part V.B. 
 141. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 13, at 506 (“While trademark owners, competitors, and perhaps 
even consumers act as though the merchandising theory is a fait accompli, where the courts are con-
cerned it is ultimately a rather fragile theory.”).  Dogan and Lemley also note that several decisions in 
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lar, scholars have expressed skepticism as to whether the use of trade-
marks on promotional products could legitimately indicate commercial 
source and accordingly be granted trademark protection.142  Instead, 
starting from the premise that the justification for merchandising is 
commonly termed as unjust enrichment,143 the majority of scholars have 
argued that recognizing this practice would result in protecting marks 
even when “the quality of product-related information in the market-
place has not suffered. . . .”144  This would shift toward a de facto proper-
tization of trademark law.145  Scholars have further highlighted that the 
recent tendency of the judiciary to protect merchandising on the basis of 
consumer “association”146 between the marks used on promotional goods 
and their owners conflicts with the Lanham Act, “which makes infringe-
ment turn not on a mental association . . . but on confusion, deception, or 
mistake.”147 
Generally, scholars have condemned the “if value, then right”148 ap-
proach that has increasingly characterized judicial decisions in this area 
because it lacks a “coherent limit”149 and could “turn trademark law from 
a right designed to facilitate commerce into a right to control lan-
guage”150—a scarce resource in the business world and society.151  Schol- 
ars have stressed the intrinsic difference between trademarks and other 
intellectual property, and have warned that the protection of this “sur-
plus value” of marks beyond their function as product identifiers could 
                                                                                                                                      
this area “were simply wrong in concluding that a trademark claim could exist in the absence of confu-
sion over whether the trademark holder had made or sponsored the merchandise.”  Id. at 473. 
 142. See McKenna, supra note 20, at 821. 
 143. See Bone, supra note 133, at 2111 (“‘[U]njust enrichment,’ focuses on sellers rather than con-
sumers.  It supposes that a seller is unjustly enriched when it appropriates to its own advantage the 
‘goodwill’ that another seller has developed in its mark.”); see also Lemley, supra note 55, at 1696–97 
(stating that a merchandising right, in contrast to traditional trademark law, is similar to a property 
right). 
 144. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 13, at 481. 
 145. On the risks of excessive trademark protection, see Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the 
Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1206 (1948), reprinted in 108 
YALE L.J. 1619, 1659 (1999) (“In an acquisitive society, the drive for monopoly advantage is a very 
powerful pressure.  Unchecked, it would no doubt patent the wheel, copyright the alphabet, and regis-
ter the sun and moon as exclusive trade-marks.”); see also, Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The 
Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717 (1999). 
 146. See discussion supra Part III.B.1. 
 147. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 13, at 482.  
 148. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi 
Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 405, 407 (1990) (“The fallacies in the right/value theory can 
be revealed in a number of ways . . . .”). 
 149. Id. at 405 (criticizing the protection of trademark “value” because this “right lacks a coherent 
limit”). 
 150. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 13, at 482.  Generally, on the concerns that trademarks could 
create a monopoly on language, see the leading case Avery & Sons v. Meikle & Co., 81 Ky. 73 (1883): 
The alphabet, English vocabulary, and Arabic numerals are to man, in conveying his 
thoughts, feelings, and the truth, what air, light, and water are to him in the enjoyment of his 
physical being.  Neither can be taken from him.  They are the common property of mankind, in 
which all have an equal share and character of interest.  From these fountains whosoever will 
may drink, but an exclusive right to do so cannot be acquired by any. 
Id. at 90; see also discussion supra Part III.A.  
 151. See discussion supra Part III.B.1. 
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imperil existing defenses and fair uses.152  Furthermore, scholars have re-
peatedly argued that this “surplus value” is generally created directly by 
consumers, who often attach special meaning and significance to their fa-
vorite marks, and not by trademark owners, who accordingly should not 
be allowed to reap benefits that they have not sown.153 
While rejecting this property-value justification for merchandising, 
some scholars have also criticized the judicial creation of the doctrine of 
“confusion as to the sponsorship”—now accepted as part of the Lanham 
Act154—which they have often labeled as a type of “irrelevant confu-
sion.”155  Specifically, scholars have noted that this unnatural expansion 
of the traditional infringement standard has added to the presumption 
that merchandised products are, or have to be, sponsored by trademark 
owners.156  This argument is circular according to scholars, but it has led 
competitors to increasingly seek trademark owners’ permission before 
using marks in order to avoid any risk of trademark infringement.157  On 
the contrary, scholars have generally argued that the use of disclaimers 
on unauthorized products, specifying the nonaffiliation of these goods 
with trademark owners, could eliminate any risk of consumer confusion, 
including as to products’ sponsorship, yet still allow competing promo-
tional goods to coexist in the marketplace along with officially authorized 
products.158 
As part of their criticisms, scholars have also repeatedly highlighted 
the potentially anticompetitive effects of the legalization of trademark 
                                                                                                                                      
 152. See Dreyfuss, supra note 148, at 405 (cautioning that protecting trademarks per se will make 
it impossible to assert traditional defenses). 
 153. Id. at 407.  “If . . . no one has an exclusive right to use the word on a shirt, a supra-
competitive price will presumably attract rivals, who will compete it down to cost.  In that event, the 
surplus value will go . . . to purchasers.”  Id.  But see Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods. Inc., 686 
F.2d 1040, 1049 (3d Cir. 1982).  “[T]he crucial element is consumer desire to associate with the entity 
whose imprint is reproduced.  This desire is based on success or notoriety which, in turn, is a result of 
the efforts of that entity.”  4 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 24:8 (quoting Univ. of Pittsburgh, 686 F.2d 
at 1040); see also Katie Moore, NFL Orders Shops to Stop Selling ‘Who Dat’ Gear, WWLTV.COM 
(Jan. 27, 2010, 9:57 PM), http://www.wwltv.com/home/Whoownswhodat-82841572.html (discussing the 
ownership of the terms “WHO DAT” after the New Orleans Saints’ victory in the 2010 Super Bowl). 
 154. See discussion supra Part III.B.2. 
 155. Lemley & McKenna, supra note 20, at 414 (“[S]ponsorship and affiliation confusion has tak-
en on a life of its own, leading courts to declare as infringing a variety of practices that might be con-
fusing in some sense, but that do not affect consumers’ decision-making process.”). 
 156. See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 396 (1999) (ar-
guing that, if courts prohibit unauthorized goods, “consumers will come to expect licensing as the 
norm, except in obvious bootleg environments.”); cf. Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & 
Mech. Coll. v. Smack Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 483 (5th Cir. 2008) (“[Because] [t]he Universities . . . 
require all licensed products to contain the licensee’s name. . . . a consumer could believe that Smack’s 
logo merely indicated that it was a licensee.”); In re Phillips-Van Heusen Corp., 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
949, 950–51 (T.T.A.B. 1986) (stating that it is not unusual for a restaurant to license use of its mark on 
clothing). 
 157. Gibson, supra note 109, at 906–27. 
 158. See Bone, supra note 133, at 2183 (noting that disclaimers “can prevent both consumer con-
fusion and the acquisition of monopoly power by official licensees”); Lemley, supra note 55, at 1708 
(discussing the “Dallas Cowboys” trademark and dismissing confusion provided that competitor uses 
“an appropriate disclaimer and makes no false reference to an ‘official licensed NFL product’”). 
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merchandising.159  In particular, while denying that merchandising marks 
can be used as indicators of commercial origin, scholars have denounced 
that to recognize merchandising rights would grant trademark owners 
protection for using marks as ornaments or products per se, which would 
foreclose competition for expressively or aesthetically functional product 
features.160  Scholars have additionally argued that to acknowledge that 
trademark owners have a “moral claim”161 against any form of free riding 
would grant broad control over competition in potentially multiple seg-
ments of the market,162 which in turn would inflate product prices and de-
crease product quality.163  Generally, scholars have noted that recognizing 
merchandising could result in market failures and prevent market access 
to competitors using the same or similar marks in different sectors of the 
market for totally different products.164  Scholars have also criticized the 
tendency of businesses to include in their trademark applications a grow-
ing number of goods and services, often on the basis of intent-to-use for 
subsequent merchandising, thus monopolizing the use of marks for entire 
product classes.165 
Although predominately critical toward this practice, not all schol- 
ars have rejected the acceptance of merchandising rights.  Instead, some 
scholars have implicitly supported recognizing this practice, even if they 
never directly stated that trademarks used on promotional products 
could legitimately satisfy the distinctive function of trademarks.166  In par-
ticular, in responding to criticism, these scholars have argued that the 
real impact of merchandising rights on competition would be minimal 
                                                                                                                                      
 159. Robert C. Denicola, Freedom to Copy, 108 YALE L.J. 1661, 1661 (1999) (“[L]aws that re-
strain copying . . . restrain competition.”). 
 160. Denicola, supra note 27, at 613 (“[If] enjoined from using a well-known insignia on T-shirts 
or caps [defendants are] effectively excluded from the market for such products.”  Specifically, these 
competitors “can sell to no one, including those who care not the slightest whether their Boston Red 
Sox cap is licensed or approved.”); see also Cherniak, supra note 14, at 1352–53 (“As some trademark 
owners do not merchandise their marks at all, consumers could be completely foreclosed from access 
to products displaying certain aesthetically appealing marks.”). 
 161. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 13, at 479. 
 162. Id.  
 163. For a detailed discussion on product prices and market competition, see Lunney, supra note 
156, at 421–37.  Besides the fact that “officially licensed” products are sold at higher prices, “[t]here 
may be just as many consumers who would rather purchase lower-priced, or receive higher quality, 
unauthorized goods.”  Id. at 398; see Heald, supra note 128, at 788 (“If anyone can sell an Atlanta 
Braves T-shirt, the median price will be lower than if only one entity has the right to sell that T-
shirt.”); see also Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2208–11 (2010). 
 164. This problem is particularly true for famous marks, which could prevent the use of the same 
or similar marks with respect to any products, related or unrelated, if a likelihood of dilution is estab-
lished.  Lanham Act § 43(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006); see, e.g., Simone A. Rose, Will Atlas Shrug? 
Dilution Protection for “Famous” Trademarks: Anti-Competitive “Monopoly” or Earned “Property” 
Right?, 47 FLA. L. REV. 653, 661–62 (1995). 
 165. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 24:9.50 (“The PTO permits the registration of a mark as 
used on promotional goods if a service company (or a producer of goods) puts its mark on promotion-
al items to be used by recipients . . . .”); see also discussion infra Part IV.A.2. 
 166. See, e.g., 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 2:31 (characterizing the process of appropriating 
others’ trademarks as “reaping where one has not sown” and “stealing”); Denicola, supra note 27, at 
640 (“The trademark owner’s unjust enrichment argument has been particularly persuasive.”). 
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because promotional products would still face competition against com-
parable products bearing different marks—a RED SOX t-shirt would 
still compete against a BOSTON UNIVERSITY t-shirt, for example—
even if they are sold exclusively under the control of trademark own-
ers.167  Similarly, they have noted that merchandising rights could “pro-
duce only a relatively modest reduction in access.”168  On the contrary, 
according to these scholars, the acceptance of trademark merchandising 
would allow trademark owners to “extract the maximum benefit from 
the mark”169 by avoiding its possible overexposure due to unauthorized 
access, which could in turn destroy the distinctiveness and uniqueness of 
a mark.170  Still, although well constructed, these arguments have not en-
countered much success in academic circles, and the scholarly debate 
continues to be characterized by skepticism. 
2. Trademark Merchandising as a “Fait Accompli” in Trademark 
Practice 
Regardless of scholarly concerns over whether merchandising rights 
are in accordance with the purpose of trademark law, trademark mer-
chandising has long represented a “fait accompli” in trademark prac-
tice.171  In particular, firmly convinced that marks belong to their business 
as property, trademark owners have generally enforced trademark rights 
and “traded in their marks”172 as “things valuable in and of them-
selves,”173 also with respect to merchandising rights.174  The benevolent 
attitude of the judiciary and the growing number of cases acknowledging 
trademark rights in merchandised products have buttressed this tendency 
by making trademark owners increasingly reliant on positive outcomes 
from litigation in this area, as long as they can prove a likelihood of “con-
                                                                                                                                      
 167. Denicola, supra note 27, at 634 (stressing that merchandising rights would “result in a fairly 
elastic demand for any particular mark”).  According to Denicola, recognizing merchandising rights 
could also prevent unnecessary legal actions.  Id. at 635.  “The transaction costs involved in invoking 
traditional doctrines will generally be substantial—costs that largely could be avoided if the right to 
ornamental use was exclusive . . . .”  Id. at 640. 
 168. Id. at 635 (“[Often licensors] demand no payment at all from their licensees.  Thus, an exclu-
sive merchandising right may at times produce only a relatively modest reduction in access.”).  
 169. Id. at 637.  
 170. Id. at 640 (“As the merchandise bearing a particular name or symbol proliferates, there is a 
risk that demand for all such items may decrease.”).  But see Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post 
Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 144–47 (2004). 
 171. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 13, at 506. 
 172. Isaacs, supra note 56, at 1210; see also Daniel E. Newman, Portraying a Branded World, 2008 
U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 357, 357 (“Using trademarks as an actual product in brand merchandise, 
rather than to signal product origin, is a longstanding commercial practice . . . .”).  
 173. See Lemley, supra note 55, at 1687–88.  
 174. See Grimes & Battersby, supra note 10, at 431 (noting that trademarks are becoming proper-
ty).  For a recent example of promotional licensing in a specific market sector, the toys industry, see 
Tricia Toney, Taking Heroes Home: Licensing Trends, TDMONTHLY (Feb. 2005), http://www.toy 
directory.com/monthly/article.asp?id=1156 (“Licensed products currently account for over one third of 
the toy industry, and the market segment keeps growing.”).  
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fusion as to the sponsorship” on the part of the public or, in the case of 
famous marks, a likelihood of dilution.175 
As a result of this de facto institutionalization of merchandising, 
trademark owners and practitioners have generally relied on their pre-
sumed merchandising rights and frequently requested other parties, 
usually with the use of cease-and-desist letters,176 to halt the production 
or distribution of most products bearing identical or similar marks,177 not 
solely counterfeited goods.178  Trademark owners and practitioners have 
often exploited these presumptively valid rights to settle claims for in-
fringement, or dilution, by imposing the acceptance of licensing agree-
ments, usually in exchange for a royalty.179  Not surprisingly, due to the 
high costs and fears of litigation,180 as well as the widespread lack of 
knowledge of the unclear legal status of merchandising in the business 
world, trademark owners and practitioners have largely emerged victo-
rious from these disputes, thus reinforcing the—still theoretically “fra-
gile”—recognition of merchandising.181 
As additional evidence of the established role of merchandising 
rights in practice, past decades have also witnessed the flourishing of a 
sizable body of manuals and guides specifically focusing on how to man-
age trademark portfolios and develop successful merchandising pro-
                                                                                                                                      
 175. See Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack Apparel Co., 550 
F.3d 465, 483–85 (5th Cir. 2008) (“[Because of] the overwhelming similarity[,] . . . consumers would 
likely be confused and believe that Smack’s t-shirts were sponsored or endorsed by the Universities.”); 
Univ. of Kan. v. Sinks, 565 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1254–55 (D. Kan. 2008) (stating that some of marks dis-
played on defendant’s t-shirts “are overwhelmingly similar to KU’s marks”); Tex. Tech. Univ. v. Spie-
gelberg, 461 F. Supp. 2d 510, 524 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (saying that defendant had “sold unlicensed prod-
ucts with the identical Texas Tech marks since its license was revoked in 2003” and “[t]herefore, Spie-
gelberg’s use of identical marks constitutes trademark dilution”). 
 176. See, e.g., 2 BARRY KRAMER & ALLEN D. BRUFSKY, TRADEMARK LAW PRACTICE FORMS 
§ 23:1 (2009).  Trademark manuals often provide sample forms of cease and desist letters.  See id. 
§§ 43:3–4; see also Moore, supra note 153 (noting that the NFL sent cease and desist letters to unli-
censed t-shirt sellers using the term “WHO DAT”). 
 177. Univ. of Ga. Athletic Ass’n v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535, 1543 (11th Cir. 1985) (preventing the use 
of plaintiff’s mark on an unrelated good, beer, because of both “the similarity of design [between the 
two marks] and the defendant’s intent”); Spiegelberg, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 52023 (protecting the use of 
university color schemes, mascots, and language on several promotional items). 
 178. Counterfeited goods are forbidden under the Lanham Act.  See Lanham Act §§ 32, 43, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (2006).  The statute defines a “counterfeit” as “a spurious mark which is identical 
with, or substantially indistinguishable from, a registered mark.”  15 U.S.C. § 1127.  The Trademark 
Counterfeiting Act also provides criminal sanctions against the trafficking of counterfeited products.  
Trademark Counterfeiting Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2320; see, e.g., Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss 
& Co., 799 F.2d 867, 872–73 (2d Cir. 1986) (“[I]t is equally clear that post-sale confusion as to source is 
actionable under the Lanham Act.”). 
 179. Critically, see Gibson, supra note 109, at 913 (noting that because of the harsh penalties im-
posed for trademark infringement “[i]t should therefore come as no surprise when trademark users 
who could mount a decent defense against an infringement claim nevertheless choose to seek a li-
cense”). 
 180. Id. at 915 (“[R]isk aversion and promotional opportunities combine to create markets for 
trademark licenses when no license is needed.”). 
 181. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
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grams.182  In particular, the emergence of trademarks as brand builders in 
an economy evermore dominated by advertising has brought a growing 
number of publications183 to stress the importance of evaluating whether 
a mark has the potential to be used as a premium or promotion apart 
from its retail life184 and can appeal to a particular life-style image.185  Sim- 
ilarly, trademark manuals have increasingly suggested that trademark 
owners should develop comprehensive marketing strategies, primarily 
with respect to market expansions and promotional products,186 and have 
frequently provided samples of merchandising agreements as models for 
trademark practitioners.187 
The adoption of the Trademark Revision Act of 1988,188 which di-
rectly established the possibility to file trademark applications based on 
bona fide intent to use and not necessarily on actual use, also contributed 
to this trend.189  Starting in the 1990s, trademark manuals and practition-
ers have routinely encouraged trademark owners to “carefully identify 
those products”—related, collateral, or promotional—for which they 
could subsequently license their marks, “prior to filing an application 
under the Trademark Revision Act.”190  Although frequently criticized by 
scholars as a further shift toward protecting trademark rights “in 
gross,”191 these applications undoubtedly represent the perfect vehicle for 
trademark owners to preventively secure trademark rights for later uses 
                                                                                                                                      
 182. See, e.g., STEVEN H. BAZERMAN & JASON M. DRANGEL, GUIDE TO REGISTERING 
TRADEMARKS (1999); 4 KRAMER & BRUFSKY, supra note 176, § 43:14; RAYSMAN ET AL., supra note 9, 
§§ 4.09, 4.11. 
 183. 4 KRAMER & BRUFSKY, supra note 176, §§ 43:7, 43:14 (providing general instructions for 
merchandising and sample forms); RAYSMAN ET AL., supra note 9, §§ 4.09, 4.11 (stressing the impor-
tance of licensing and including sample agreements). 
 184. GREGORY J. BATTERSBY & CHARLES W. GRIMES, LAW OF MERCHANDISE AND 
CHARACTER LICENSING § 1:1 (2009) (“Merchandising now affords small businessmen the opportunity 
to compete on equal terms with large manufacturers, who historically were the only ones who could 
afford to invest the substantial sums required by classic marketing techniques.”). 
 185. Id. § 7:10. 
 186. Id. § 11:1 (“It has been said there are only two sure things in life—death and taxes.  In the 
merchandising area, there is a third—successful merchandising properties will be infringed.”).  
 187. See RAYSMAN ET AL., supra note 9, § 4.11 (providing guidelines in drafting, inter alia, clauses 
for compensation, quality control, ownership, enforcement, and termination of contract). 
 188. Trademark Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935 (1988) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (1989)). 
 189. Lanham Act § 1(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) (2006).  Intent-to-use applications require objective 
evidence of bona fide intended use and applicants are advised to keep detailed document of these 
uses.  37 C.F.R. § 2.89(a)(3),(d) (2009); see Commodore Elecs. Ltd. v. CBM Kabushiki Kaisha Opposi-
tion, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1503, 1507 n.12 (T.T.A.B. 1993).  But see The Wet Seal Inc. v. FD Mgmt. 
Inc., No. 91157022, 2007 WL 458529, at *14 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 9, 2007) (“[That the] applicant may not 
have taken steps to actually launch or introduce a particular product does not mean that applicant 
otherwise had no intention to develop or market the product.”); Lane Ltd. v. Jackson Int’l Trading 
Co., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d 1351, 1356 (T.T.A.B. 1994) (noting that the development of a business plan and 
licensing program is sufficient to show a bona fide intent to use). 
 190. BATTERSBY & GRIMES, supra note 184, § 8:14. 
 191. See discussion supra Part IV.A.1. 
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on promotional products192 since they create “constructive use priority 
for newly registered marks as of the filing date of the application.”193 
Ultimately, a long established line of reasoning within the USPTO 
has also confirmed the importance of merchandising rights in practice.194  
Notably, following the leading judicial cases of the 1970s and 1980s,195 a 
growing number of decisions from examining attorneys and rulings from 
the Trademark Trial Appeal Board (TTAB) have routinely allowed reg-
istrations for use on merchandised products and upheld oppositions 
based on the use of marks on collateral goods.196  Specifically, the ex-
aminers and the TTAB have commonly adopted the doctrine of “confu-
sion as to the sponsorship” for assessing the validity of trademark appli-
cations and claims opposing registrations.197  Additionally, the TTAB has 
repeatedly affirmed that “the licensing of commercial trademarks for use 
on ‘collateral’ products . . . which are unrelated in nature to those goods 
or services on which the marks are normally used, has become a common 
practice in recent years”198 and that merchandising “has become part of 
everyday life.”199  Still, although these decisions have contributed to the 
de facto recognition of merchandising, the USPTO has followed the posi-
                                                                                                                                      
 192. After filing an intent-to-use application, applicants are given a notice of allowance, provided 
that no opposition has been filed.  Applicants have six months to file a statement of use to obtain 
trademark registration (extendable to one year automatically and up to three years for good cause).  
See 37 C.F.R. § 2.89. 
 193. BATTERSBY & GRIMES, supra note 184, § 8:20. 
 194. See, e.g., In re 12th Man/Tenn., No. 78020515, 2008 WL 1897548, at *5 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 22, 
2008); Balt. Ravens Ltd. P’ship v. 12th Man/Tenn. LLC, No. 91157082, 2007 WL 683781, at *11 
(T.T.A.B. Feb. 28, 2007); Chi. Bears Football Club, Inc. v. 12th Man/Tenn. LLC, No. 91150925, 2007 
WL 683778, at *12 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 28, 2007); DC Comics v. Pan Am. Grain Mfg. Co. Inc., No. 
91125404, 2005 WL 2093233 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 24, 2005); Turner Entm’t Co. v. Nelson, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1942, 1945–46 (T.T.A.B. 1996); Gen. Mills Fun Group, Inc. v. Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc., 204 U.S.P.Q. 
396, 403 (T.T.A.B. 1979), aff’d, 648 F.2d 1335 (C.C.P.A. 1981). 
 195. See supra Part III.B.1.  
 196. See, e.g., Turner, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1945–46 (sustaining an opposition to the unlicensed 
trademark use based on trademark owners’ use of the mark on collateral items including beach tow-
els); Gen. Mills, 204 U.S.P.Q. at 400 (acknowledging the practice to license trademarks on unrelated 
collateral goods). 
 197. See Dreamwerks Prod. Grp., Inc. v. SKG Studio, 142 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(“[M]ovies and sci-fi merchandise are now as complementary as baseball and hot dogs.”); In re Sloppy 
Joe’s Int’l Inc., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d 1350, 1356 (T.T.A.B. 1997) (acknowledging that because of public 
awareness of licensing practices consumers could be confused as to sponsorship of promotional Hem- 
ingway clothing); Univ. Book Store v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385, 1402 
(T.T.A.B. 1994) (holding that the licensing of various Wisconsin Badgers trademarks brought the pub-
lic to consider the University of Wisconsin Madison as a “secondary source” for collateral products).  
For a recent example involving one of the marks used in the Introduction, see H-D Mich. LLC v. 
Broehm, No. 91177156, 2009 WL 1227921, at *8 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 28, 2009) (holding that Harley-
Davidson’s use of the “bar and shield” logo on clothing would cause consumers to believe that reg- 
istrant’s use of a similar logo on promotional goods came “from the same source or a source author- 
ized by opposer”). 
 198. In re God’s Prop., Inc., No. 78739748, 2007 WL 2422992, at *2 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 20, 2007) 
(quoting In re Phillips-Van Heusen Corp., 228 U.S.P.Q. 949, 951 (T.T.A.B. 1986)).  The TTAB has 
repeatedly affirmed, for example, that “items of clothing . . . appear to represent a particularly natural 
area for the ‘collateral products’ use of commercial trademarks.”  In re Phillips-Van Heusen Corp., 228 
U.S.P.Q. at 951. 
 199. DC Comics v. Pan Am. Grain Mfg. Co., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d 1220, 1225 (T.T.A.B. 2005). 
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tion of the courts and has so far left room for different interpretations in 
this area on a case-by-case basis.200 
B. Consequences of the Disconnected Debate on Merchandising Rights 
As elaborated in the previous paragraphs, the profound divide be-
tween trademark theory and practice over merchandising rights stems di-
rectly from the intrinsically opposite views of opponents and supporters 
of this practice with respect to the general scope of trademark protection.  
As a result of these inherently conflicting interpretations, the debate in 
this area has reached a difficult impasse without providing a satisfactory 
solution for any of the interested parties—trademark owners, competi-
tors, and consumers.201  Hence, because of the relevance of promotional 
products in virtually every sector of today’s economy,202 this situation is 
not merely a cause of theoretical frustration for scholars and practition-
ers, but also a source of confusion and a potential detriment for trade-
mark owners and competitors.203 
Notably, in the absence of an official position on the issue, trade-
mark owners are left wondering about their ability to control and enforce 
trademark rights with respect to unauthorized promotional goods.204  
Meanwhile, competitors lack clear guidance as to the conditions upon 
which they can legitimately use trademarks without the consent of 
trademark owners.205  Because of the divergence of opinions in this area, 
competitors also frequently receive conflicting answers about the legiti-
macy of their actions, which could amount to fair use according to schol- 
ars,206 or constitute infringement or dilution according to practitioners.207  
Not surprisingly, because of this uncertainty and the “widespread ignor-
ance of the law”208 that largely defines the business world, trademark 
owners and competitors have generally adopted the interpretations of 
                                                                                                                                      
 200. See discussion infra Parts IV.B, V.A–B. 
 201. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, §§ 24:7–20 (offering a detailed reconstruction of the vari-
ous position on the merchandising debate). 
 202. Drescher, supra note 3, at 331 (noting that companies are increasingly using their brand 
names on new products in different product markets).  But see Brand-Stretching Can Be Fun—and 
Dangerous, ECONOMIST, May 5, 1990, at 77 (stressing the importance of brand-stretching’s cost-
effectiveness, but warning that excessive extension may become detrimental to the brand name). 
 203. See discussion supra Part IV.A.1–2. 
 204. See Gibson, supra note 109, at 908. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Some scholars criticize the cases granting merchandising rights in line with Boston Profes-
sional Hockey, and argue that courts should follow the line of cases that started with Job’s Daughters 
and Rainbow for Girls and reject trademark owners’ claims.  See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 13, at 
477–48 (discussing Bos. Prof’l Hockey Ass’n v. Dall. Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1012 
(5th Cir. 1975)). 
 207. Despite sharp criticism from scholars, practitioners still bring lawsuits on the grounds of Bos-
ton Professional Hockey and similar decisions.  RAYSMAN ET AL., supra note 9, § 9.01.  
 208. Isaacs, supra note 56, at 1210. 
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the facts at issue that best fit their particular needs,209 thus perpetuating 
inconsistency in this area. 
As a result, trademark owners have increasingly enforced trade-
marks with respect to unauthorized promotional goods, at times basing 
their claims on questionable foundations.210  Recent judicial decisions 
have facilitated this trend by confirming the validity of these claims, es-
pecially in the presence of existing licensing agreements.211  In addition, 
the desire to proactively affirm their rights for a large number of prod-
ucts has caused trademark owners to systematically file intent to use 
trademark applications to reserve vast numbers or even entire classes of 
goods and services, with dubious effects for market competition.212  To 
the contrary, competitors have continued to use other parties’ marks on 
promotional products without authorization,213 frequently engaging in 
borderline infringing or diluting activities—at times in good faith, but al-
so intentionally214—and thus triggering aggressive trademark enforce-
ment.215 
Although often based on misunderstandings or convenient interpre-
tations of trademark norms by the various parties, these actions have 
nevertheless translated into seriously adverse effects for the market and 
the judicial system.216  In particular, the mistaken, but persistent, belief of 
trademark owners that they own marks as properties has frequently re-
                                                                                                                                      
 209. For a general discussion on the need to control competitors’ opportunistic behaviors, see 
Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual Property Litigation, 44 
B.C. L. REV. 509 (2003). 
 210. For an exhaustive list of these cases, see Lemley & McKenna, supra note 20, at 42226. 
 211. See, e.g., Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack Apparel Co., 
550 F.3d 465, 485 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Universities annually sell millions of dollars worth of licensed ap- 
parel.”); Univ. of Kan. v. Sinks, 565 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1235 (D. Kan. 2008) (“[Plaintiff’s sales] of li-
censed products . . . contributed to more that $12 million in wholesale sales, and at least $20 million in 
retail sales of licensed KU products in 2006 alone.”); Tex. Tech Univ. v. Spiegelberg, 461 F. Supp. 2d 
510, 516 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (underlining that plaintiff allowed “over 450 licensees to sell these officially 
licensed products”). 
 212. Lawmakers have cautioned that excessive use of these applications for one mark may result 
in a lack of a bona fide intent.  S. REP. No. 100-515, at 23–24 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5577, 5587.  In particular, defensive applications to preempt third party’s uses have frequently been 
found engaging in bad-faith filing.  Caesars World, Inc. v. Milanian, 247 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1182 (D. 
Nev. 2003); see also David S. Ruder, New Strategies for Owners of Discontinued Brands, 3 NW. J. 
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 61, 74–75 (2004) (suggesting that intent-to-use applications can prevent third 
parties from considering the use of a trademark, but also warning that the party may be challenged 
with a claim of bad faith). 
 213. For a recent controversy involving the unauthorized use of the New Orleans Saints’ “WHO 
DAT” marks, see Moore, supra note 153. 
 214. See Smack Apparel, 550 F.3d at 482 (“[Defendant] knew that its shirts were sold in the same 
venues as and sometimes alongside officially licensed merchandise, and it intentionally incorporated 
color marks to create the kind of association with the Universities that would influence purchasers.”). 
 215. See, e.g., 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, §§ 24:7–20. 
 216. Some scholars have noted that the uncertainty surrounding merchandising has raised both 
administrative and error costs.  See Bone, supra note 133, at 2123.  Scholars have also highlighted that, 
because of the large potential damages resulting from findings of infringement, trademark owners en-
gage in rent-seeking behaviors and demand payment for the use of their marks.  See Gibson, supra 
note 109, at 920. 
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sulted in unnecessary trademark enforcement and litigation,217 which in 
turn has brought otherwise superfluous claims to the attention of the 
courts.  Besides adding extra costs to the judicial system,218 these suits 
have produced high costs for the litigants,219 which have inevitably been 
transferred to the market through higher prices, reduced quality or 
product availability, and, in some instances, the complete cessation of 
economic activities.220  Furthermore, as indicated above, because of fears 
and the costs of litigation, competitors often accept unnecessary, and at 
times expensive, licensing agreements.221 
On the other side, the uncertainty surrounding the protection of 
merchandising rights has offered seemingly valid excuses for competitors 
who are clearly engaging in acts of unfair competition to the detriment of 
trademark owners, legitimate licensees, and the public.222  This uncertain-
ty has also contributed to the aggressive enforcement in this area since, 
should trademark owners not react promptly to unauthorized promo-
tional products, they could later face claims of trademark abandonment, 
laches, or acquiescence.223  Finally, the repeated statement from trade-
                                                                                                                                      
 217. For example, although the University of Kansas claimed that an unlicensed t-shirt vendor 
was infringing Kansas’ trademarks on a significant number of t-shirt designs, the court found infringe-
ment only on a small number of designs using marks that were “overwhelmingly similar” to plaintiff’s 
marks.  Univ. of Kan. v. Sinks, 565 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1254–55 (D. Kan. 2008); see also Univ. of Ala. Bd. 
of Trs. v. New Life Art, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1258–59 (N.D. Ala. 2009) (denying the university’s 
exclusive rights on the colors of the team uniform). 
 218. Generally, frivolous claims can be sanctioned under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2) (“By presenting to the court a pleading . . . [a] party certifies 
that . . . the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfri-
volous argument . . . .”); see also North Face Apparel Corp. v. Williams Pharm., Inc., No. 
4:09CV2029RWS, 2010 WL 546921, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 9, 2010) (denying a motion to dismiss, the 
judge warned that “[a]lthough this filing may not reach the level of frivolity, it approaches the line”). 
 219. Scholars have repeatedly highlighted the additional costs for litigants of unnecessary trade-
mark litigation.  See Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extortion: The End of Trademark Law, 65 WASH. & 
LEE. L. REV. 585, 602–06 (2008).  Port also denounces trademark owners’ “predation,” which creates 
an atmosphere in which potential market entrants believe they will be sued for trademark infringe-
ment.  Id.; see also Michael Grynberg, Trademark Litigation as Consumer Conflict, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
60, 112 (2008). 
 220. See Lunney, supra note 156, at 435 (“Even where protection does not go so far as to fore-
close competitive entry altogether, protection will necessarily entail some degree of anticompetitive 
loss . . . .”).  
 221. See, e.g., Out of Many, One, supra note 22, at 32 (noting that after the NFL agreed to only 
license Reebok to produce clothing bearing NFL teams’ trademarks, “the price of caps promptly rose, 
by 50%, while team jerseys began selling for 40% more.”). 
 222. For a reconstruction of the relevant case law, see 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, §§ 24:7–20. 
 223. The Lanham Act states that a mark is “abandoned” when “its use has been discontinued 
with intent not to resume such use” or “[w]hen any course of conduct of the owner . . . causes the mark 
to become the generic name for the goods or services . . . .”  Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).  
Trademark owners who engage in promotional use of their mark must closely protect their mark.  
Emergency One, Inc. v. Am. FireEagle, Ltd., 228 F.3d 531, 535–36 (4th Cir. 2000).  But see Univ. Book 
Store v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1392–93 (T.T.A.B. 1994) (refusing 
to find abandonment because, despite previous unlicensed uses, the marks still signified the university 
for the relevant consuming public).  In addition, trademark owners must duly enforce their rights to 
prevent claims of laches and acquiescence.  See Lanham Act § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 1069; Kellogg Co. v. Ex-
xon Corp., 209 F.3d 562, 569 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[L]aches and acquiescence require proof that the party 
seeking to enforce its trademark rights has unreasonably delayed pursing litigation and, as a result, 
materially prejudiced the alleged infringer . . . .”). 
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mark scholars that the simple use of disclaimers on unauthorized promo-
tional products could prevent consumer confusion224 has dangerously 
provided some room for counterfeiters to argue that counterfeited prod-
ucts could be legal225 when accompanied by disclaimers as to their non-
affiliation with trademark owners so as to preventively avoid any likeli- 
hood of consumer confusion as to the origin of the products.226 
V. THE CASE FOR A LIMITED PROTECTION OF TRADEMARK 
MERCHANDISING 
As described in Parts III and IV, despite doctrinal concerns, trade-
mark practices have long adopted a de facto acceptance of trademark 
merchandising following the increased benevolence from the judiciary 
and the legislature.  Still, neither courts nor Congress have granted clear 
legal status to this practice and disagreements continue to characterize 
this area of the law to the detriment of trademark owners and competi-
tors. 
Part V considers the shortcomings of the current merchandising de-
bate and offers an alternative solution to the scholarly opposition to 
trademark merchandising.  Notably, Part V advocates for the clear pro-
tection of this practice when marks are used to identify and distinguish 
promotional products offered for sale under the general principles of 
trademark law.  Contrary to criticism, this solution will not adversely af-
fect consumers, but rather will offer a needed guideline about the extent 
of protection of this practice, which can no longer be ignored or disre-
garded in our society.  
A. Flaws of the Disconnected Debate on Merchandising Rights 
As repeatedly noted, most of the disagreement over merchandising 
rights originates from the fundamentally different positions of opponents 
and supporters over the scope of trademark law.  In particular, whereas 
scholars have opposed merchandising because of the unnatural expan-
sion of trademark rights, the business world has welcomed this practice 
as a natural extension of business activities.227  Adding to this divide, re-
cent statutory and judicial developments have progressively favored 
merchandising, but only on a case-by-case basis under the doctrine of 
                                                                                                                                      
 224. See Bone, supra note 133, at 2182–83. 
 225. See, e.g., Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Lee, 875 F.2d 584, 58889 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that treble 
damages were appropriate remedy even for innocent infringement as a deterrent for further illegiti-
mate activities); 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 25:10 (noting that counterfeiting is a major concern for 
luxury goods and health and safety related products); Richard S. Higgins & Paul H. Rubin, Counterfeit 
Goods, 29 J.L. & ECON. 211, 217–26 (1986). 
 226. See Malletier v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp., No. 04 CV 2644(RMB), 2006 
WL 1424381, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2006) (holding that plaintiff’s counterfeit claims failed because 
there was not a likelihood of consumer confusion).  But see Dogan & Lemley, supra note 13, at 491 
(denying that clearly counterfeited products could be legally sold or distributed). 
 227. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
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“confusion as to the sponsorship.”228  Not surprisingly, this uncertainty 
has resulted in increasing criticism in this area.229  Still, the reasons for 
this uncertainty can be directly attributed to the flaws of the merchandis-
ing debate itself, and particularly to the lack of dialogue among scholars, 
trademark owners, and practitioners, and their often limited analysis of 
trademark law and policy.230 
With respect to the scholarly opposition, for example, scholars have 
traditionally criticized merchandising based on the assertion that trade-
mark law should focus exclusively on consumer protection.  Hence, scho-
lars have frequently ignored the principle that the general scope of 
trademark law and policy has historically included protecting business 
goodwill against misappropriation.231  Notably, the principle that trade-
marks are both conveyers of commercial information and symbols of 
business goodwill has been “a milestone in trademark theory.”232  Courts 
have repeatedly reinforced this principle in the past century,233 although 
they initially protected goodwill only narrowly and in restricted mar-
kets.234  Still, prompted by societal and economic changes, courts and 
Congress gradually broadened the interpretation of goodwill and the ex-
tent of its protection.235  Accordingly, despite scholars’ ideological oppo-
sition to merchandising rights, rather than being based on a “fragile 
theory,”236 the judicial and legislative support for this practice reflects an 
established principle of trademark protection—goodwill misappropria-
tion—which scholars cannot continue to ignore to reach a comprehensive 
solution in the merchandising debate. 
In addition, while criticizing the standard of “confusion as to the 
sponsorship” adopted by the courts and confirmed by the statute as a 
dangerous expansion of the traditional requirement of “likelihood of 
consumer confusion,”237 scholars have often disregarded the fact that in-
fringement against promotional products can also be found by applying 
                                                                                                                                      
 228. See discussion supra Part III.B.1. 
 229. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, §§ 24:7–20. 
 230. Id. 
 231. See, e.g., United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) (“[A trade-
mark’s] function is simply to designate the goods as the product of a particular trader and to protect 
his good will against the sale of another’s product as his; and it is not the subject of property except in 
connection with an existing business.”).   
 232. Calboli, supra note 4, at 782–83.  But see Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of 
the Concept of Goodwill in Trademark Law, 86  B.U. L. REV. 547, 592 (2006) (“[G]oodwill protection 
has influenced expansions of trademark law, the most troubling of which are linked to a broad concep-
tion of goodwill that includes elements unrelated to source identification.”).  
 233. See discussion supra Part III.A; see also Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924) 
(“A trade-mark only gives the right to prohibit the use of it so far as to protect the owner’s good will 
against the sale of another’s product as his.”); S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 4 (1946), reprinted in 1946 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1275 (“To protect trade-marks, therefore, is to protect the public from deceit, to 
foster fair competition, and to secure to the business community the advantages of reputation and 
good will by preventing their diversion from those who have created them to those who have not.”). 
 234. See McKenna, supra note 64, at 1858. 
 235. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 236. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 13, at 506. 
 237. See discussion supra Part III.B.1. 
CALBOLI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/26/2011  1:54 PM 
No. 3] TRADEMARK MERCHANDISING 901 
the traditional standard to the allegedly infringing products.  In particu-
lar, scholars have generally ignored that the courts have consistently held 
that consumer confusion can be expected and implied, without any addi-
tional factor analysis, when identical or sufficiently similar marks are 
used on identical or directly competing goods.238  Hence, under this inter-
pretation, confusion can easily be expected and implied, and infringe-
ment can be found against most unauthorized promotional goods, which 
are invariably identical or directly compete with officially licensed goods 
and carry identical or strikingly similar marks.239  Here again, notwith-
standing scholars’ reluctance to accept that trademarks can legitimately 
identify promotional products,240 no sound reason has so far emerged 
from the scholarly debate to deny merchandising marks the same protec-
tion granted to all marks, as long as these marks are used to distinguish 
the products to which they are affixed, even if simply in terms of spon-
sorship, affiliation, or business approval.241 
Finally, scholars’ arguments about merchandising’s effects on com-
petition also show a limited analysis of the issue.242  In particular, al-
though the scholarly debate has highlighted valid concerns with respect 
to the risk of excessive market control, market failures, and rising prod-
uct costs, most of this critique applies to trademark protection in general.  
As trademark commentators have repeatedly observed, all marks, 
                                                                                                                                      
 238. AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348 (9th Cir. 1979) (“When the goods produced 
by the alleged infringer compete for sales with those of the trademark owner, infringement usually will 
be found if the marks are sufficiently similar that confusion can be expected.”); see also Polaroid Corp. 
v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) (suggesting that confusion can be expected for 
similar marks when the products are identical).  This direct “presumption” of confusion, and thus in-
fringement, for identical products carrying identical marks is also explicitly stated in Article 16 of the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Right according to which “[i]n case of 
the use of an identical sign for identical goods or services, a likelihood of confusion shall be pre-
sumed.”  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 16, April 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M. 1197, 1203 
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].  Accordingly, this principle should be considered accepted based upon the 
obligations of the United States as a member of TRIPS, and confusion shall be presumed when the 
products and the marks at issue are identical, as most often in the case of unauthorized promotional 
goods.  See generally Lanham Act §§ 32, 43, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (2006). 
 239. See, e.g., Audi AG v. D’Amato, 469 F.3d 534, 542–43 (6th Cir. 2006); Gen. Motors Corp. v. 
Lanard Toys, Inc., 468 F.3d 405, 412 (6th Cir. 2006); Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., 
Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1074 (9th Cir. 2006); WSM, Inc. v. Tenn. Sales Co., 709 F.2d 1084, 1086–87 (6th 
Cir. 1983). 
 240. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 13, at 471 n.38 (noting that in merchandising cases “the 
mark has acquired trademark status through use in connection with some other primary activi-
ty . . . .”); Dreyfuss, supra note 148, at 408 (“[I]t is somewhat perverse to encourage the trademark 
owner’s primary activity by facilitating the capture of profits from some other goods”).  But see Univ. 
of S.C. v. Univ. of S. Cal., 367 F. App’x 129, 132–33 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (treating merchandising marks as 
product marks while denying the appeal of the University of South Carolina against the TTAB deci-
sion to refuse to register the “SC” mark because of direct confusion with the mark from the University 
of Southern California). 
 241. By asserting that the use of disclaimers could also dispel any risk of confusion as to the 
“sponsorship” or “affiliation” of the products, scholars have implicitly admitted that consumers could 
in fact be confused as to the origin of the products, although scholars have commonly argued that this 
confusion is simply the result of the increased presumption among the public that licensing agreements 
and authorization are the norm.  See, e.g., Bone, supra note 133, at 2183. 
 242. See discussion supra Part IV.A.1. 
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whether used on promotional goods or primary products, constitute a li-
mited monopoly and a barrier to entry because their recognition is based 
on an ad hoc right granted by the law to exclude others from using the 
same mark under specific circumstances.243  Still, despite this unavoidable 
exclusionary component, trademarks have also long been identified as 
essential tools in the market economy because of their ability to distin-
guish products from competing ones and to inform the public about 
product quality.244  To carefully balance these conflicting interests—
“right to exclude” for trademark owners, “right to compete” for competi-
tors, and “right to be properly informed” for consumers—trademark law 
and policy have cautiously crafted trademark protection by imposing 
strict limits for the acquisition and enforcement of trademark rights,245 as 
well as have created specific defenses to safeguard fair competition and 
noncommercial uses of marks in society.246  Accordingly, no additional 
distortions of competition need to result from the use of marks on pro-
motional products compared to trademark use in general, as long as the 
courts apply trademark rules correctly and prevent trademark abuses.247 
Probably even more than scholars, trademark owners and practi-
tioners have also based their arguments in favor of merchandising on a 
convenient analysis of trademark rules.  In particular, while favoring 
merchandising as a natural expansion of goodwill protection, trademark 
owners and practitioners have repeatedly downplayed that the primary 
purpose of trademark protection is to guarantee the fair functioning of 
the market for competitors and consumers.248  Notably, trademark own-
                                                                                                                                      
 243. Lunney, supra note 156, at 421 (“In any form, trademark protection grants to a particular 
individual a bundle of rights . . . . [T]ypically included in this bundle is the right to exclude others from 
using the mark in certain contexts.”); see also Brown, supra note 145, at 1206; Charles E. Mueller, 
Sources of Monopoly Power: A Phenomenon Called ‘Product Differentiation,’ 18 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 3 
(1968).  
 244. See Landes & Posner, supra note 45, at 265–66 (1987) (resolving the problems related to the 
justification of trademark protection because trademarks “promote economic efficiency”); see also 
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW 166–68 (2003).  For a detailed analysis of the conflicting interests at the core of the 
debate on trademark protection and the acceptance of the position that trademarks play a fundamen-
tal role in the competitive process and market economy, see supra Part III.A–B. 
 245. See discussion supra Part III.A (noting the conditions of the protection and enforcement of 
trademarks). 
 246. See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL 
AGE 890–947 (5th ed. 2010) (discussing various defenses in trademark law). 
 247. Scholars have often advocated that trademark use on promotional products constitutes an 
anomaly and argued that disclaimers could dispel any relevant confusion.  Bone, supra note 133, at 
2183.  Scholars have generally excluded, however, that disclaimers could be used to exclude confusion 
with respect to products potentially infringing trademark owners’ primary activity.  Denicola, supra 
note 27, at 613.  “If an impostor markets cameras under the Kodak mark, no purpose is served by an 
order permitting the use on condition that the defendant also append a disclaimer of connection with 
the Eastman Kodak Corporation.”  Id.  This Article objects to this position and argues that whether 
marks are used on “primary” or promotional products, current trademark rules cannot, and should 
not, discriminate between these uses, as long as marks are effectively used in commerce to identify 
product origin, also in terms of direct “sponsorship” or “affiliation.”  Contra id.   
 248. See McClure, supra note 51, at 329.  “The result of the realist attack brought about changes 
in the rhetoric of judges and commentators . . . . The property justification of protection was replaced 
by arguments in favor of protecting business good will or values resulting from use.”  Id.  As a result of 
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ers and practitioners have often failed to appreciate that trademark law 
does not grant trademark owners an absolute right to exploit trademark 
value, but instead carefully limits the extent of trademark protection to 
prevent the abuse of trademark rights.249  Thus, as much as scholars 
should accept the relevance of protecting goodwill as part of the mer-
chandising debate, trademark owners and practitioners should accept 
that the primary role of trademark law is to guarantee consumers and the 
market, and not business per se, to facilitate a solution in this area. 
Generally, trademark owners and practitioners have also minimized 
the dangers that unlimited merchandising rights could entail for society, 
both in terms of appropriation of words and symbols and negative effects 
for competition.250  Besides frivolous lawsuits and extra costs for the legal 
system,251 this perception has brought trademark owners to increasingly 
invoke trademark protection beyond consumer confusion and against 
trademark dilution for not truly famous marks.252  Additionally, trade-
mark owners and practitioners have frequently ignored that protection 
against unauthorized promotional products cannot be based on the de-
sire to control marks “in gross” with respect to any imaginable goods and 
services.  Instead, this protection should apply only when trademarks are 
used to identify promotional products in the market, and based upon an 
effective likelihood of consumer confusion as to the products’ source, 
even if at-large,253 with only the exception of the protection of famous 
marks against dilution254 as repeated by the courts.255  Thus, trademark 
owners and practitioners should not continue to push the boundaries of 
trademark protection, already largely benevolent for businesses, to their 
advantage and to the detriment of competition.  
                                                                                                                                      
these changes, “[p]rotecting the public from confusion and deception became a more prominent ra-
tionale than protecting property.”  Id. 
 249. See discussion supra Part III.B.1.  See McGeveran, supra note 21, at 56–66 (highlighting the 
increasing conflicts over expressive fair uses in trademark law, and the chilling effect resulting from 
aggressive and unnecessary litigation); see also Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Developing Defenses in Trade-
mark Law, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 99, 117 (providing an excellent review of existing defenses, 
and their limits, and arguing for a clearer use of existing trademark limitations as defenses supporting 
unauthorized trademark uses). 
 250. See, e.g., Lunney, supra note 156, at 485 (noting that copying and competition are the excep-
tion, rather than the rule, in a property-based trademark regime). 
 251. See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
 252. Port, supra note 219, at 589. 
 253. Courts have denied infringement when trademark owners did not use or abandoned their 
marks.  See, e.g., Emergency One, Inc. v. Am. FireEagle, Ltd., 228 F.3d 531, 535 (4th Cir. 2000); Sil-
verman v. CBS Inc., 870 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1989); Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods. Inc., 686 
F.2d 1040, 1049 (3d Cir. 1982); Supreme Assembly, Order of Rainbow for Girls v. J.H. Ray Jewelry 
Co., 676 F.2d 1079, 1085 (5th Cir. 1982); Int’l Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 
912, 920 (9th Cir. 1980); De Beers LV Trademark Ltd. v. DeBeers Diamond Syndicate Inc., 440 F. 
Supp. 2d 249, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).  
 254. Port, supra note 219, at 555–56 (“The Supreme Court has continuously held that the trade-
mark right is ‘not in gross’ and not a copyright or a patent, but that any rights to trademarks are appur-
tenant to the related business.”). 
 255. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 24:11 (providing a comprehensive survey of the relevant 
cases).  But see discussion supra Part III.A and accompanying notes. 
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Finally, trademark owners and practitioners have regularly mini-
mized the importance of trademark defenses and fair use and have in-
creasingly enforced trademarks as absolute rights in the marketplace.256  
Yet, as correctly pointed out by scholars, this attitude has brought unne-
cessary chilling effects to the market, avoidable law suits, and abusive 
rent-seeking behaviors.  Accordingly, even if trademarks owners are in-
terested in maximizing the value of trademarks by entering multiple 
market sectors and establishing large licensing portfolios, trademark 
owners and practitioners need to accept that trademark protection is not 
absolute under the law.  Instead, they need to acknowledge that this pro-
tection is subject to the existing defense of fair use established by statute 
and the judiciary, whose purpose is to safeguard market competition and 
the fundamental values of free speech for society, to reach a satisfactory 
solution to the merchandising debate. 
B. Calling for a Limited Protection of Merchandising Rights 
As described in Parts III and IV, although largely criticized by 
trademark scholars, trademark merchandising has become a very suc-
cessful reality in the business world and in legal practice.257  Clearly aware 
of this importance, courts have repeatedly acknowledged the validity of 
trademark rights on promotional products under the doctrine of “confu-
sion as to the sponsorship.”258  Congress has also joined this trend and in-
corporated this doctrine into the statutory language as the general stan-
dard for acts of unfair competition.259  In turn, this judicial and statutory 
favor has reinforced the presumptive validity of merchandising and trig-
gered large trademark enforcement, at times on the basis merely of the 
impairment of trademarks per se.260 
Despite the increasing benevolence of the courts and the legislature, 
doctrinal opposition continues nonetheless to characterize this area and 
                                                                                                                                      
 256. Generally, practitioner manuals counsel owners on how to avoid and limit any defenses that 
unlicensed users may have against infringement claims, thus promoting, perhaps unknowingly, oppor-
tunistic behavior by trademark owners and practitioners.  See RAYSMAN ET AL., supra note 9, § 4.09 
(providing a discussion of the major aspects of trademark licensing).  
 257. See Marks, supra note 71, at 646–47.  Already in the 1970s and 1980s, “the volume of mer-
chandising activity has grown by several hundred percent.”  Id.  Specifically, “[i]n 1978, Walt Disney 
Productions reported $21.3 million in licensing royalties based on $427 million in retail sales of li-
censed products.  In 1983, Yves Saint Laurent S.A. showed a gross income of $27 million, of which $17 
million was derived from licensing.”  Id. at 647 (citation omitted). 
 258. See, e.g., Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack Apparel Co., 
550 F.3d 465, 490 (5th Cir. 2008); Bos. Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 29 (1st Cir. 1989); Univ. 
of Ga. Athletic Ass’n v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535, 1546 (11th Cir. 1985); Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs. v. New 
Life Art Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1240–41 (N.D. Ala. 2009); Univ. of Kan. v. Sinks, 565 F. Supp. 2d 
1216, 1253–54 (D. Kan. 2008); Tex. Tech Univ. v. Spiegelberg, 461 F. Supp. 2d 510, 519 (N.D. Tex. 
2006); Nat’l Football League Props., Inc. v. Consumer Enters., Inc., 327 N.E.2d 242, 246 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1975). 
 259. See discussion supra Part III.B.2. 
 260. See Kozinski, supra note 32, at 971 (“If unlicensed items are of poor quality, or portray the 
product in an unfavorable light, they take away not only from the goods in the secondary market, but 
in the primary market as well.”). 
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trademark owners and competitors still lack a precise guideline regarding 
the legitimacy of their actions.261  As a result, fears of later claims for 
trademark abandonment, laches, or acquiescence have frequently 
brought trademark owners to enforce their rights in doubtful cases, 
whereas fears and costs of litigation have increasingly brought competi-
tors to seek official licenses, at times unnecessarily.262  Invariably, the 
costs of these actions or agreements have been transferred to consumers 
in terms of inflated prices, reduced product quality or quantity, and, at 
times, less competition altogether.263 
This situation must be resolved.  As repeatedly noted, today’s econ-
omy relies heavily on trademark merchandising in every sector of the 
market for an increasing number of products.  Thus, even “[i]f it is true 
that ambiguities [always] characterize trademark law because of its so-
cial, emotional, and irrational basis,”264 the market and the legal system 
cannot afford to perpetuate the current disconnect between theory and 
practice with respect to merchandising.  Accordingly, the time has come 
to resolve the current divide between opponents and supporters of this 
practice and accept the validity of merchandising rights under current 
trademark rules, as already suggested by the courts and supported by the 
statute, to finally indicate to competitors in the market a precise guide-
line in this contested area. 
1. Cabining Trademark Merchandising Under Current Trademark 
Rules 
In light of the above, the most sensible solution to address the di-
vide that continues to characterize the merchandising debate is to expli-
citly recognize merchandising rights when marks are used on promotion-
al products by trademark owners or licensees to identify the products’ 
source, as well as the products’ sponsorship or affiliation, and to distin-
guish these products from similar goods.265  Contrary to common criti-
cism, this protection of merchandising would not further restrict competi-
tion in the market because it would not add any ad hoc protection for 
trademarks used on merchandised products compared to trademarks in 
                                                                                                                                      
 261. See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
 262. Gibson, supra note 109, at 907 (noting that competitors are “risk-averse and do not want to 
take their chances with trademark’s indeterminate doctrines and supracompensatory remedies”); Port, 
supra note 219, at 587 (“[V]irtually all trademark holders use trademark litigation to secure market 
share . . . .”). 
 263. Lunney, supra note 156, at 435 (“[B]roader trademark protection generally means higher 
prices for consumers and more extensive anticompetitive losses for society.”). 
 264. Calboli, supra note 4, at 833. 
 265. For a similar position in the licensing context, see Keating, supra note 9, at 363 (“This com-
mercial activity might properly be entitled ‘Promotional Trademark Licensing.’”).  Although support-
ing the recognition of “promotional trademark licensing,” Keating does not elaborate, however, on the 
analysis of the fact that trademarks used on promotional products can legitimately indicate products’ 
source and thus be subjected to the general trademark principles. 
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general.266  Instead, this protection would finally provide a precise guide-
line for the validity of this practice, while cabining the recognition of 
merchandising rights within current norms and defenses.267 
Undoubtedly, to directly acknowledge the validity of merchandising 
rights under this premise would immediately solve the uncertainty that 
defines this area.  Competitors would finally be provided with a more 
precise standard as to the legitimacy of their actions while enforcing or 
using trademarks with respect to promotional products.268  This clear ac-
ceptance of merchandising rights when marks are used to distinguish 
promotional products would thus provide a compromising solution to the 
present controversy based upon the position expressed by the majority of 
the courts269 and accepted by the legislature with the 1988 amendment to 
the Lanham Act.270  As this Article has repeated, even if the judiciary has 
increasingly recognized de facto merchandising rights and enjoined unau-
thorized trademark uses on merchandised goods in the presence of offi-
cial licensing schemes, this judicial line of reasoning has left considerable 
room for inconsistency and opposition.271 
Most importantly, to explicitly recognize that marks used on promo-
tional products legitimately qualify as indicators of commercial source 
would not only acknowledge that these marks are entitled to trademark 
protection, it would also cabin the extent of this protection under the 
current rules and limitations applicable to all marks under the Lanham 
Act.272  In particular, trademark rights in merchandised products would 
be protected against unauthorized trademark uses exclusively on the ba-
sis that trademark owners or licensees use the marks for which protec-
tion is sought.273  Only upon this use, trademarks used on promotional 
products would be protected against infringement when confusingly simi-
lar marks are used on competing or similar products, provided that a  
likelihood of confusion as to the origin, sponsorship, or affiliation of the 
                                                                                                                                      
 266. See discussion supra Part V.A. 
 267. Lanham Act §§ 32, 43(c), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(c) (2006) (stating actions for trademark 
infringement and dilution, as well as exceptions to dilution protection); id. §§ 14, 43, 45 (stating de-
fences of genericness, functionality, and abandonment); see 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 24:1720 
(suggesting that a trademark owner’s rights in markets in which it may explore in the future should be 
limited by the perception of consumers); see also Univ. of Kan. v. Sinks, 565 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 126062 
(D. Kan. 2008) (examining whether plaintiff’s claims were barred by laches, estoppel, waiver, fair use, 
functionality, and the First Amendment). 
 268. See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
 269. See discussion supra Part III.B.1. 
 270. See Lanham Act § 43(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1). 
 271. See discussion supra Part IV.A.1. 
 272. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 273. Univ. of S.C. v. Univ. of S. Cal., 367 F. App’x 129, 132–33, 135–36 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (treating 
merchandising marks as “product marks” and finding the respective “SC” logos of the Universities of 
South Carolina and Southern California confusingly similar).  But see Dreyfuss, supra note 148, at 408; 
Ramsey, supra note 22, at 40001 (discussing the difficulties of determining whether merchandising 
use constitutes valid trademark “use”); see also Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 
539 U.S. 23, 33 (2003).  
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products could be found on the part of the public.274  According to the 
general rule, this protection would not extend, however, to unrelated 
products,275 unless the marks at issue are famous276 and a likelihood of di-
lution by blurring or tarnishment could be proven.277  Ultimately, as re-
peatedly affirmed by the judiciary, both in the case of nonfamous and 
famous marks, this protection would also not apply when third parties 
are not using the same or similar marks “as trademarks.”278 
Equally important, granting merchandising rights legal status when 
marks are used on promotional products offered for sale by trademark 
owners or under licensing would also subject this practice to the general 
trademark defenses and fair uses currently set forth by the law for all 
marks.279  Trademark rights in promotional products would thus be expli-
citly limited by the statutory defenses provided under the Lanham Act 
and trademark owners would not be able to enforce their rights upon 
evidence of abandonment, laches, or acquiescence.280  Likewise, mer-
chandising rights would be subject to the defenses of descriptive and  
nominative fair use, comparative advertising, parody, and criticism, as 
repeatedly affirmed by courts281 and recently confirmed by Congress in 
                                                                                                                                      
 274. Lanham Act §§ 32(1)(a), 43(a)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1)(a), 1125(a)(1)(A); see Dogan & 
Lemley, supra note 39, at 1678  (“[T]he likelihood-of-confusion standard . . . takes for granted that the 
defendant is using the mark to promote its own sales.”); see also AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 
F.2d 341, 348 (9th Cir. 1979); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 21 cmt. a (1995) 
(“The test for infringement is whether the actor’s use of a designation as a trademark . . . creates a  
likelihood of confusion . . . .”). 
 275. See L.E. Waterman Co. v. Gordon, 72 F.2d 272, 273 (2d Cir. 1934) (“There is indeed a lim-
it . . . . It would be hard, for example for the seller of a steam shovel to find ground for complaint in 
the use of his trade-mark on a lipstick.”); Quality Inns Int’l, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 695 F. Supp. 
198, 210 (D. Md. 1988) (“On the other hand, two marks that serve to identify products in two unre-
lated markets may very well coexist without confusion in the public’s eye.”); Morgan Creek Prods., 
Inc. v. Foria Int’l, Inc., No. 91173806, 2009 WL 4075479, at *9 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 28, 2009) (rejecting 
plaintiff’s infringement claim because of the “dissimilarity of the goods due to their nature, the man-
ners in which they are sold or distributed, and the circumstances under which consumers would en-
counter them”).  
 276. Lanham Act § 43(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). 
 277. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 24:11 (examples include “UNITED airlines and 
UNITED van lines,” “EAGLE shirts, EAGLE pencils, EAGLE pretzels, EAGLE brand condensed 
milk,” “CHAMPION spark plugs and CHAMPION sports wear,” “DELTA airlines, DELTA dental 
insurance and DELTA faucets,” “ACE retail hardware stores and ACE bandages,” “TROPICANA 
Las Vegas hotel and TROPICANA orange juice,” “[t]he DOW stock market index and DOW chemi-
cal company,” and “DELL computers and DELL magazines”).  Even if the marks use the same word, 
the elements of sight and meaning are still relevant to a determination of a likelihood of confusion.  Id. 
§ 23:21. 
 278. A large number of courts have affirmed that terms have to be used in a “trademark sense” to 
infringe.  See, e.g., 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 409 (2d Cir. 2005) (stating 
that infringement does not apply if defendants are not using the mark to identify product source); see 
also Dogan & Lemley, supra note 39, at 167590.  Dilution actions are also excluded for noncommer-
cial uses of trademarks.  Lanham Act § 43(c)(3)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 1225(c)(3)(C) (excluding dilution ac-
tions for “[a]ny noncommercial use of a mark”). 
 279. See 6 MCCARTHY,  supra note 12, § 31; MERGES ET AL., supra note 246, at 890–942. 
 280. See Lanham Act §§ 19, 45, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1069, 1127. 
 281. See 6 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, §§ 31:153156.50 (elaborating on trademark fair uses).  
Courts have generally accepted parody as fair use.  See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 
894 (9th Cir. 2002).  Courts have also created the doctrine of “nominative fair use” to protect the un-
authorized use of a mark to describe competitors’ products to the extent necessary and truthfully.  See 
CALBOLI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/26/2011  1:54 PM 
908 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2011 
the TDRA.282  In other words, whereas unauthorized identical and similar 
products would explicitly constitute trademark infringement, unautho-
rized promotional products using famous or nonfamous marks for the 
purpose of comparative advertising, parody, commentary, etc., would in-
stead be protected as fair uses under present trademark rules and estab-
lished case law.283  To date, courts have not specifically addressed the ap-
plication of trademark defenses and fair uses in merchandising cases and 
risk adverse competitors have entered often unnecessary licensing 
agreements fearing the negative outcomes of litigation.284  Under the 
proposed solution, these occurrences could be potentially avoided, or at 
least limited, if courts apply trademark principles correctly.  
Finally, accepting the validity of merchandising rights under current 
trademark rules would also subject the validity of this practice to the re-
quirement of “quality control” provided for trademark licensing285 when 
                                                                                                                                      
New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc. 971 F.2d 302, 307–09 (9th Cir. 1992).  For the rela-
tionship between trademark law and the First Amendment, see, for example, Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Ban-
tam Doubleday Dell Pub. Grp., Inc., 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 282. Section 43(c)(3) of the Lanham Act expressly excludes dilution actions for: 
(A) Any fair use, including a nominative or descriptive fair use, or facilitation of such fair use, of a 
famous mark by another person other than as a designation of source for the person’s own 
goods or services, including use in connection with— 
 (i) advertising or promotion that permits consumers to compare goods or services; or  
 (ii) identifying and parodying, criticizing, or commenting upon the famous mark owner or the 
     goods or services of the famous mark owner. 
(B) All forms of news reporting and news commentary.  
(C) Any noncommercial use of a mark.  
Lanham Act § 43(c)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3). 
 283. See, e.g., Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 217–21 (3d Cir. 
2005) (providing a detailed analysis of fair uses); Mattel, 296 F.3d at 907 (holding that defendant’s use 
of Mattel’s “Barbie” mark in a song not infringing because of noncommercial use and parody); Play-
boy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 802 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that defendant could use plain-
tiff’s marks to advertise her affiliation with plaintiff’s magazine); Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. 
Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 464 F. Supp. 2d 495, 507 (E.D. Va. 2006), aff’d, 507 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 2007) 
(affirming fair use because defendant only mimicked the LOUIS VUITTON mark).  But see Mut. of 
Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 404 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding consumer confusion in favor of 
plaintiff).  For a general discussion on parody and fair use, see Richard A. Posner, When Is Parody 
Fair Use?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 67 (1992). 
 284. Although courts have confirmed the application of defenses and fair use to trademark mer-
chandising, they have generally found or denied infringement based on likelihood of confusion, and 
accepted or denied dilution claims based on blurring or tarnishment.  See, e.g., Univ. of Pittsburgh v. 
Champion Prods., Inc., 686 F.2d 1040, 1044–46 (3d Cir. 1982) (focusing primarily on the doctrine of 
laches); Supreme Assembly, Order of Rainbow for Girls v. J.H. Ray Jewelry Co., 676 F.2d 1079, 1082 
(5th Cir. 1982) (providing no discussion of trademark defenses); Bos. Prof’l Hockey Ass’n, Inc., v. 
Dall. Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1013 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975) 
(undertaking a brief discussion of functionality).  Still, the effective judicial application of defenses and 
fair use will prove fundamental to prevent chilling effects in trademark practice and guarantee a last-
ing solution in this area.  See, e.g., McGeveran, supra note 21, at 56–57. 
 285. Lanham Act §§ 5, 45, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1055, 1127; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 33 cmt. b (1995) (“If the trademark owner exercises reasonable control over the na-
ture and quality of the licensee’s goods or services, the benefits of the licensee’s use accrue to the 
trademark owner.”). 
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merchandising activities are conducted under licensing.286  Although the 
judiciary has increasingly drifted away from a strict interpretation of 
“quality control” and focused primarily on the “consistent quality” of the 
licensed good,287 this requirement would additionally cabin the extent of 
merchandising protection to those promotional products whose quality is 
guaranteed by trademark owners.288  Alternatively, should trademark 
owners not guarantee consistent product quality and deceive consumers, 
trademark rights could be forfeited.289 
2. Reconciling Theory and Practice on Protecting Trademark 
Merchandising 
Undoubtedly an important priority for the business world, any solu-
tion to solve the existing uncertainty in the merchandising debate should 
nonetheless carefully consider the interests of consumers and fair compe-
tition in the market.290  To recognize the validity of merchandising rights 
when marks are used directly by trademark owners or under licensing to 
identify and distinguish promotional products would precisely satisfy this 
need and bring a required legal response to a long established business 
reality, still within existing trademark norms.291  Under this standard, 
trademark owners and competitors would have a precise guideline to 
compete fairly in the market, and the judicial system would avoid the 
unnecessary lawsuits that are frequently brought because of basic misun-
derstandings about the nature of merchandising.292 
In particular, although recognizing the validity of trademark mer-
chandising when marks are directly used on promotional products would 
not eliminate the natural tendency of trademark owners to control marks 
as “things,” this recognition would nonetheless provide competitors with 
a sound basis to refuse unnecessary licensing.  Notably, it would clarify 
which unauthorized trademark uses do not require trademark owners’ 
                                                                                                                                      
 286. According to section 14(3) of the Lanham Act, lack of quality control can lead to a petition 
of trademark cancellation, if a mark is used “to misrepresent the source of the goods or services on or 
in connection with which the mark is used.”  Lanham Act § 14(3), 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3); see, e.g., Bar-
camerica Int’l USA Trust v. Tyfield Imps., Inc., 289 F.3d 589, 598 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 287. See Nitro Leisure Prods., LLC v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (New-
man, J., dissenting) (noting that consistent quality means the product is “bearing the mark” (quoting 1 
MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 3:10)); Taco Cabana Int’l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1121 
(5th Cir. 1991) (noting that consistent quality means “no actual decline in quality standards”), aff’d, 
505 U.S. 763 (1992). 
 288. See, e.g., Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods. Inc., 686 F.2d 1040, 1047 (3d Cir. 1982). 
 289. “The lack of litigation in this respect seems to signify that consumers have been generally 
satisfied with the quality of promotional products.”  Calboli, supra note 5, at 383 n.250. 
 290. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 291. As repeatedly noted, scholars have generally opposed the creation of an ad hoc merchandis-
ing right.  See, e.g., Dogan & Lemley, supra note 13, at 506 (“Most cases of consumer confusion can be 
solved without a merchandising right.”).  By recognizing that trademarks, which are used to identify 
promotional products directly by trademark owners or under licensing, constitute valid trademark 
rights, this Article agrees with this position because trademark protection under the suggested regula-
tion of merchandising is not based on an ad hoc new right but simply on existing trademark rules. 
 292. See discussion supra Part IV.A.1–2. 
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consent because products are not similar or because of existing de-
fenses.293  As outlined in the previous paragraph, this recognition would 
also “ground”294 the extent of trademark protection on the basis of the 
fact that merchandising marks are used on promotional goods and sub-
ject their enforcement to the traditional tests for consumer confusion or 
trademark dilution,295 within the limitations set forth by trademark de-
fenses and fair uses.296 
Contrary to common criticism, recognition of merchandising rights 
under the general trademark rules would not necessarily imply increased 
costs for market competition.  As already noted by some scholars, al-
though protecting merchandising could result in slightly higher product 
prices compared to a system without a legally recognized “right to ex-
clude” in this respect, the “fairly elastic demand”297 for promotional 
products in the market would ultimately offset the majority of these 
costs.  Consumers may switch to alternative products or boycott promo-
tional goods altogether if prices become too high.298  Accordingly, trade-
mark owners would still need to sell products competitively or risk losing 
market share and potential profits.  When merchandising activities are 
conducted by licensees, the need to cover production costs and create 
profits in addition to the payment of royalties may also drive licensees 
away from noncompetitive trademark owners in favor of entities that 
better respond to market competition.  Contrary to scholars’ arguments 
that protecting merchandising would amount to a monopoly on orna-
mental product features, the suggested recognition of merchandising un-
der current rules would simply permit trademark owners to receive pro-
tection when using trademarks to identify promotional goods, while 
leaving consumers free to choose among similar products available in the 
market.299 
                                                                                                                                      
 293. See Rebecca Tushnet, Why the Customer Isn’t Always Right: Producer-Based Limits on 
Rights Accretion in Trademark, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 352, 356 (2007).  “Trademark law’s con-
tinued reliance on concepts of free competition, as well as free speech, allows it to keep consumer con-
fusion from turning trademark law into a right to control all references to a mark . . . . Acknowledging 
and fortifying trademark’s well-established balancing doctrines is the best way to break out of the 
feedback loops . . . .”  Id. at 357. 
 294. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 39, at 1675–77.  
 295. See, e.g., Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs. v. New Life Art, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1259 (N.D. 
Ala. 2009) (denying infringement when an artist uses the color of a team’s uniform to depict historical-
ly accurate football scenes); MasterCard Int’l Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm., No. 00 Civ. 
6068(GBD), 2004 WL 434404 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2004) (denying infringement where Ralph Nader pa-
rodized the MasterCard “Priceless” slogan for political purposes); see also Lemley & McKenna, supra 
note 20, at 41622 (listing several examples of trademark owners’ attempts to prevent the unautho-
rized use of their marks when such uses clearly qualified as fair use). 
 296. See discussion supra Part V.A. 
 297. Denicola, supra note 27, at 634. 
 298. Id. 
 299. For example, should consumers find that the price of the RED SOX sweatshirt they would 
like to purchase is too high compared to similar goods, consumers may decide to purchase, instead, a 
sweatshirt with the logo of another baseball team or a sweatshirt with the logo of a football team, like 
the GREEN BAY PACKERS, or with the logo of their university.  Or, consumers could decide to 
purchase a sweatshirt with the NIKE logo, or with a different logo or design altogether.  In other 
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Rather than negatively impacting the market, directly recognizing 
merchandising under the suggested framework could instead benefit con-
sumers by increasing the number of comparable products available to the 
public.  In particular, when prohibited from using third parties’ marks on 
their t-shirts, mugs, or key chains because of likely consumer confusion 
or dilution, producers of these goods could choose between entering into 
a licensing agreement with trademark owners, or altogether using an al-
ternative and original design for their products.  This alternative design 
could use the same mark under an established defense—parody, nomina-
tive fair use, etc.—or a totally different and original work.  Accordingly, 
consumers could have access to a larger number of similar promotional 
products—more t-shirts, mugs, or hats with different logos or designs—to 
the overall benefit of the market competition and societal creativeness.300 
Based upon these premises, it seems indisputable that the proposed 
solution would provide the most sensible compromise to the current im-
passe.  Notwithstanding their diverging positions over the extent of 
trademark protection, trademark scholars, trademark owners, and practi-
tioners would undoubtedly agree that the ultimate function of trademark 
law is to prevent commercial misconduct in the market and harm to both 
consumers and businesses.301  As this Article has demonstrated, protect-
ing merchandising rights when marks are used by trademark owners, di-
rectly or under licensing, to identify promotional products against confu-
singly similar goods or against diluting uses of the marks, would not 
unnaturally expand trademark protection.  Instead, it would simply rec-
ognize that trademarks used on promotional products legitimately quali-
fy for trademark protection and straightforwardly apply to these marks 
the existing trademark principles—protecting consumers, competition, 
and trademark goodwill. 
Despite the reluctance of merchandising opponents to accept the 
reality of modern trademark law, the role of marks has undergone a pro-
found evolution in the past century, and trademark merchandising is a 
direct reflection of this process.302  Major changes in product manufactur-
ing and distribution303 have deeply transformed the concepts of product 
origin and consumer confusion.  These concepts have long departed from 
the increasingly remote case of products directly manufactured by 
                                                                                                                                      
words, consumers could choose among similar products since the logo affixed on the sweatshirt does 
not represent the product per se, but only indicates the affiliation of that sweat-shirt with the team, 
institution, or company which is identified by the logo.  Thus, despite scholars’ reluctance to accept 
this reality, recognizing the validity of trademark rights in promotional products as legitimate identifi-
ers of commercial origin would not deprive consumers of alternative choices of similar products identi-
fied by other marks. 
 300. On the theory of incentive to justify trademark protection, see Denicola, supra note 27, at 
634; Landes & Posner, supra note 45, at 270 (stating that protection of trademarks is essential to create 
an incentive for owners to invest resources and create new marks). 
 301. See discussion supra Part V.A.  See generally 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 2 (analyzing the 
policy rationales of trademark law). 
 302. Drescher, supra note 3, at 32138. 
 303. Id.; see also discussion supra Part III.B.  
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trademark owners and consumers directly confused about the actual 
manufacturing source of these products.304  Instead, the notion of product 
source unequivocally extends today to multiple forms of business control 
and approval over manufacturing, including the authorized products’ 
sponsorship and affiliation.305  Consequently, the concept of consumer 
confusion today legitimately includes the case of consumers’ confusion 
over this controlled and approved manufacturing process and whether 
the resulting products have been authorized by trademark owners.306  
Still, despite these changes in the economy and the rise of a branded 
world, the belief among many trademark owners that marks represent 
absolute rights remains erroneous,307 and the protection of marks used on 
promotional products should continue to focus primarily on safeguarding 
market competition and consumers.  “With fame often comes unwanted 
attention,”308 and although courts should forbid infringing or diluting uses 
of identical or similar marks affixed to unauthorized promotional prod-
ucts, unauthorized goods carrying nonconfusingly similar marks or prod-
ucts using famous marks for parodies and otherwise established fair uses 
without trademark owners’ consent should be allowed to continue for the 
benefit of market competition and society.309 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As this Article has shown, the significance of trademark merchan-
dising in today’s economy is unquestionable, both to establish brand im-
age and customer affiliation, or simply as an effective advertising tool.  
Still, the legal status of merchandising rights continues to be disputed to 
the detriment of trademark owners, competitors, and consumers in the 
                                                                                                                                      
 304. For a discussion on the increasing distance between product manufacturers and trademark 
owners, see McKenna, supra note 20, at 821; see also Lynn M. LoPucki, Toward a Trademark-Based 
Liability System, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1099, 1114–15 (2002) (generally advocating the responsibility of 
franchisors for torts committed by franchisees). 
 305. Bd. of Supervisor for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 
465, 483 (5th Cir. 2008); Bos. Prof’l Hockey Ass’n, Inc., v. Dall. Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 
1004, 1011–12 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975); Univ. of Kan. v. Sinks, 565 F. Supp. 2d 
1216, 1234 (D. Kan. 2008); Tex. Tech Univ. v. Spiegelberg, 461 F. Supp. 2d 510, 523–24 (N.D. Tex. 
2006); see also Lemley & McKenna, supra note 20, at 42226.  The NFL and other major sports  
leagues have consistently produced evidence that a large majority of consumers “believe that emblems 
and sportswear bearing team names and insignia are sponsored” by the leagues.  Denicola, supra note 
27, at 611–12.  
 306. Lanham Act § 43(a)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
 307. Extensive marketing literature supports, however, the concept of “brand equity,” which di-
rectly conflicts with the traditional account for trademark protection in the legal context, that is, that 
trademarks are not “properties” and cannot be protected “in gross.”  See, e.g., David A. Aaker, The 
Value of Brand Equity, 13 J. BUS. STRATEGY, July—Aug. 1992, at 27, 28; Cathy J. Cobb-Walgren et al., 
Brand Equity, Brand Preference, and Purchase Intent, 24 J. ADVERTISING 25, 25–26 (1995).  Because 
of its limited scope, this Article does not address the differences between the marketing and legal ap-
proach to the valuation and protection of brands. 
 308. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 309. Cf. McGeveran, supra note 21, at 56–66 (highlighting the problems related, in general, to the 
actual enforcement of fair use exceptions in trademark law). 
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market.  Well aware of the growing importance of merchandising rights, 
the judiciary has protected the use of marks on merchandising products 
de facto under the doctrine of “confusion as to the sponsorship.”  Con-
gress eventually codified this doctrine into the trademark statute, but 
neither the judiciary nor Congress explicitly framed merchandising rights 
in the legal context.  This in turn has left room for doctrinal opposition 
and uncertainty.  Because of the relevance of trademark merchandising 
in the economy, this uncertainty should be resolved to safeguard fair 
competition in the market and avoid unnecessary legal actions. 
As this Article has proposed, the most sensible solution to this un-
certainty is to follow the position suggested by the courts and accepted 
by Congress, and recognize the validity of trademark merchandising 
when marks are used to identify promotional products in the market by 
trademark owners or under licensing.  As this Article has demonstrated, 
this solution would not create additional distortions to market competi-
tion or negatively impact consumers.  Instead, it would provide a needed 
legal standard for competitors and grant protection to merchandising 
marks only as long as these marks are used to indicate to the public the 
source of promotional products, even if also in terms of products’ spon-
sorship or affiliation.  As this Article has underlined, this solution would 
limit the protection of merchandising marks under the existing norms for 
infringement and dilution, subject to trademark defenses and fair use.  
Ultimately, as long as courts apply trademark defenses and fair use cor-
rectly, this protection would not trigger abusive trademark enforcement.  
Rather, it would resolve the divide between trademark theory and prac-
tice in one of the most controversial, but also most important, aspects of 
the modern economy. 
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